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This piece regards nontraditional trademarks like sound, color, scent or even the vertical opening motion of a
Lamborghini car door. The protection of trademarks has, historically, walked a fine balance. Naturally, as a
society, we want to protect trademarks so that transaction costs are lowered as purchasers make a quick and
easy purchasing decision. You see Tide, you know Tide, you buy Tide. However, the protection of
nontraditional trademarks upsets this fine balance. If we go too far in the protection we grant unwarranted
monopolies to companies to stifle the precise competition the law was meant to encourage. Sometimes, we do
not have to protect a trademark claimant to recognize the savings in search costs. In fact, nontraditional
trademarks are ornamental, at best, and, at worst, a horrible distraction from the larger job of substantive
harmonization so that the transactions costs might be lessened for all companies around the world.
This article traces the origins of this protection and concludes that nothing in our history predicts or requires
this protection. One Supreme Court decision in 1995 open the floodgates for trademark application activity,
but litigation rates did not, correspondingly, increase. I relied on a study I did of all 2,762 reported trademarks
decisions from the inception of the Lanham Act (the US trademark law) through 2007. I coded every case.
The numbers are reported in this article. Trademark registration activity is still very small and litigation
activity is near nonexistent.
However, the United States requires potential trading partners to protect nontraditional trademarks or we will
not enter into bi-lateral trade agreements. We have encouraged the World Intellectual Property Organization
to conduct a massive study on the protection of nontraditional marks. Based on this flawed study, some
countries are now contemplating amending their trademark laws to explicitly recognize nontraditional
trademarks.
This is a cause without an objective. People generally believe that America routinely protects nontraditional
trademarks. My data indicates that this is not the case. Then, countries are attempting to harmonize to the
standard of protecting nontraditional trademarks thinking that is required in the United States when it is not.
In the end, this provides an amazing distraction to the greater goal of harmonizing trademark laws. Civil Law
countries believe they are harmonizing to an international standard of trademark law when that standard is a
fiction created by the United States (without malice). Instead of working on far more important goals that
have remained elusive for 120 years and without concern to harmonizing the underlying theory of trademark
protection, countries are focusing efforts on protecting the motion of a Lamborghini door.
My argument is that this is unfortunate. We should understand the distinctions between the two systems and
work to close that gap in a meaningful way. No matter how many countries protect the motion of a
Lamborghini door opening, without harmonizing the underlying theory and without addressing real issues,
real harmonization will remain elusive
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International substantive trademark law harmonization has been an abject
failure. This failure is manifested in the inconsistent treatment of nontraditional
trademarks. This article exposes the perceived broad protection of nontraditional
trademarks for the great deception that it is. By allegedly protecting nontraditional
trademarks, the United State renders true trademark harmonization impossible.
The United States itself and commentators go too far in expressing this protection.
In fact, nontraditional trademark protection is extremely limited, very rare and
almost never enforced. Yet, the United States requires trading partners to protect
nontraditional trademarks as if it is a mainstay of trademark jurisprudence in the
United States, when it is not. The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and the international community are in the process of harmonizing to this
fictitious standard. This will render real efforts at genuine trademark
harmonization even more difficult to attain.
Part II of this article describes the setting of nontraditional trademark
jurisprudence in the United States. It concludes that Americans boast of
protection of odd appellations of source, but in reality, it is very infrequently
accomplished and then only at great expense.
Part III traces the etymology of the words "symbol" and "device", the precise
statutory terms upon which the protection of nontraditional trademarks rests.
Parts IV - XI address each known type of nontraditional trademark. Specific
data is provided to conclude that color and sound make up virtually all
nontraditional trademarks and that the data does not support claims of
nontraditional trademarks playing a meaningful role in United States trademark
jurisprudence.
Part XII presents a very brief explication of the Common Law of trademarks
compared to the Civil Law of trademarks so that one can see the disparate views
of trademark protection.
Part XIII provides a normative attack on the protection of nontraditional
trademarks and concludes that, in almost all cases, they do not operate as
indicators of source and therefore should not be protected.
* Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Institute, William Mitchell College of
Law. I am indebted to Madeline Bowie (2010) for her research assistance. I am also grateful to
Jim Baker, Adjunct Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law and the members of my
Contemporary Issues in IP class for their input and feedback of an earlier draft of this article. I am
also grateful to Neal Axton, Reference Librarian, William Mitchell College of Law, for his research
and input.
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Part XIV concludes that nontraditional trademarks do not play the major role
in American trademark jurisprudence that some want us to believe. There has been
registration activity but no corresponding reported enforcement activity. As such,
much is made of nontraditional trademark protection but it is a vacuous promise.
The world should not harmonize to the vacuous. If we harmonize, it should be to a
standard that will be effective in lowering trade barriers, increasing the free flow of
goods and services, and generally making the lives of trademark holders easier, not
to a fictitious standard that is almost entirely meaningless.
II. CONTEXT
"Nontraditional trademarks," include sensory marks such as sound, color,
scent, taste, and tactile marks, and also holographic marks or even the motion of
a product. They play an increasingly important role in the plan of some to
engage in "extreme branding."' Nontraditional indicators of source purportedly
become a valid trademark when they are or become distinctive of the good or
service on which they are used and, in the minds of the consumers, come to
identify a consistent source or origin for that good or service 2 and can be
represented graphically. Nontraditional trademarks fall into the larger category
of trade dress discussed in the Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S.
159 (1995) decision and, as such, must have secondary meaning to be protected.
The Qualitex case itself is said to be a "stunning breakthrough for nontraditional
trademarks."A
In fact, United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) application
statistics indicate that there were only 93 nontraditional trademarks on record
1. See, e.g., EXTREME BRANDING, http://www.extremebranding.com (last visited Sept. 22,
2011). This phrase itself is a purported trademark, although unregistered. This term was recently
coined by Nick Pisarsky, Note, PoTAYto-PoTAHto-Let's Call the Whole Thing Off Trademark
Protection of Product Sounds, 40 CONN. L. Rav. 797, 800 (2008). A trademark application for
EXTREME PERSONAL BRANDING was received by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) but was soon abandoned. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Leg Up
Marketing, LLC, Serial No. 78847574 (indicating the mark has been abandoned) available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-78847574.
2. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
3. Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (color scheme on
rubber bands to denote resistance has acquired secondary meaning and is protectable); Mana
Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (no secondary meaning
for black compacts in ordinary shapes used within the industry as a whole); Knitwaves Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995) (ecological design on sweaters is distinctive). As of yet,
an unanswered question is whether product packaging that amounts to a nontraditional trademark
could be inherently distinctive and protectable without possessing secondary meaning. In Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), the Supreme Court held that product
packaging could be inherently distinctive but not product design. That case is silent on the
nontraditional trademark discussed herein.
4. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-
Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 782
(2005).
2 [Vol. 38:1
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prior to the Qualitex decision.' After the Qualtex decision published on March
28, 1995, there have been 688 trademark applications filed for nontraditional
trademarks.6 That is, in the first 48 years of the existence of the Lanham Act,
there were 93 nontraditional trademarks filed (1.93 per year). In the 14 years
since the Qualitex decision, there have been 688 trademark applications for
nontraditional trademarks (approximately 49 a year).' This is an explosion of
interest in nontraditional trademarks.
Contrary to the claims of some that Qualitex resulted in a "stunning
breakthrough,"' in fact, Qualitex did not have the same impact on the number of
reported cases involving nontraditional trademarks.
10  In the 48 years before
Qualitex, there were 20 reported cases; in the 14 years since Qualitex (for which
there is data), there have been 15 reported cases." Per year that amounts to a
doubling of the number of cases (pre-Qualitex: .42 per year; post-Qualitex: 1.07
per year); however, as these numbers remain around one per year, it is hard 
to
see this as a "stunning breakthrough" and certainly not the exponential increase
that there was in applications.
T 4a
Even so, nontraditional trademarks still make up an infinitesimally small
portion of all trademark applications or registrations. In August of 2009,
5. See iitra app. E
6 Seeinfraapp.E.
7. See in/ra app. E.
8. See infra app. E.
9. Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 4.
10. Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph A: Total Ntumber of Reported Cases Per
Year. http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-proprty61e/W-TMStudykGaphA1.pdf.
2. Source of graph: http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/?page 
32 1&Mitchell+
Study4 on+Trademark+Litigationl.
13. See infra note 14 (comparing number of nontraditional trademarks to number of 
total
trademarks).
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approximately 0.01504% of all trademark applications on record with the PTO
were for nontraditional trademarks.14
Yet, much is made of this ability in the United States to register
nontraditional trademarks' 5 and the United States has even placed pressure on
other countries to expand the scope of other countries' trademark laws to include
the protection of nontraditional trademarks.' 6  The Singapore Treaty on
Trademarks in 2006 was the first treaty to explicitly recognize nontraditional
trademarks although it also stated that signatory states are under no obligation to
adopt "new types" of trademarks.' 7  This interest in and support for
14. A search on the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) maintained by the USPTO,
for "(live)[LD] or (dead)[LD]" on August 28, 2009 returned 5,192,791 records. This is the total
number of trademark applications on file with the PTO as of that date. The number of
nontraditional trademarks gathered from TESS yielded 781 applications as of August 28, 2009.
Therefore, the percentage of nontraditional trademarks on file with the PTO in any capacity, be
they applications, registrations, abandoned or canceled, is only 0.01504%. For a similar search
done in 2006, see Nick Pisarsky, Note, PoTAYto-PoTAHto-Let's Call the Whole Thing Off
Trademark Protection of Product Sounds, 40 CONN. L. REv. 797, 803 n.28 (2008) (showing that
the percent of nontraditional trademarks was .00727%). Note that there is no search term that will
search all nontraditional mark applications in TESS. As a result of the limitations of TESS
nontraditional trademark applications must be gathered by using various search terms in addition to
searching "('6')[MD]", which returns marks that cannot be visually perceived. Therefore, the 780
nontraditional trademark applications cannot be considered an absolute number as there is an
unquantifiable margin of error when searching nontraditional marks on TESS.
15. Russell H. Falconer, Big Future for Nontraditional Marks, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at
C28 (discussing risks and opportunities of nontraditional mark use); Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson
LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting
Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773 (2005).
16. This pressure comes in the form of free trade agreements. If a country wants a free trade
agreement, the United States' agreement contains a provision to require partner nations to protect
sound and scent marks. To date, no other nontraditional marks are protected in the free trade
agreements. See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.2(2),
May 18, 2004, 2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 162, 234, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/Australia/asset-upload-file469-5141
.pdf which reads in its entirety as follows: "Neither Party may require, as a condition of
registration, that marks be visually perceptible, nor may a Party deny registration of a mark solely
on the ground that the sign of which it is composed is a sound or a scent.". The free trade
agreements with 13 other nations contain similar requirements. See generally, Free Trade
Agreements, Office of the United States Trade Representative http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (providing texts of other free trade agreements). The
International Trademark Association (INTA) has its own model free trade agreement that requires
countries to protect sound, single colors, and three-dimensional shape marks. See Model Free
Trade Agreement Proposals Intellectual Property Rights: Trademark Law,
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapmodelfreetrade.pdf (expressing intent to protect sound, single
color, and three-dimensional shape marks).
17. Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, R. 3(5) available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/tlt r _dc/tlt r dc 30.pdf ("[Hologram Mark, Motion
Mark, Color Mark, Position Mark] Where the application contains a statement to the effect that the
mark is a hologram mark, a motion mark, a color mark or a position mark, a Contracting Party may
require one or more reproductions of the mark and details concerning the mark, as prescribed by
the law of that Contracting Party"). The United States position on nontraditional trademarks seems
to be that the PTO will support international efforts in this regard because there is so little else
where cooperation seems possible at this given moment.
4 [Vol. 38:1
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nontraditional trademarks is paying off as Japan has moved to adopt
nontraditional trademarks and even WIPO's Standing Committee on the Lawy of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographic Indications has recently taken
this up in the fbrm of a major study and report. 8 At least one entire book was
published by the International Trademark Association that gives the implication
that protecting nontraditional trademarks is a common, routine and a frequent
affair.'9
In fact, the registration of nontraditional marks in the United States is a very
difficult, time consuming and expensive endeavor. Nontraditional trademark
registrations constitute a minute fraction of all registered trademarks in the
United States.20 Furthermore, nontraditional trademarks are extremely difficult
to enforce. Of the 2,762 reported Lanham Act cases since 1947, the inception
date of the Act, 35 (1.27%) were cases regarding a nontraditional trademark and
of those 13 (37%)2 prevailed when the national average over the 60 years of the
Lanharn Act is that the plaintiff prevailed 50% of the time.22
Pemiaps of Nantradidao radmr Utigation whe
Some of the more well-known registered nontraditional marks include the
roar of the lion in the initial credit scenes of a movie (owned by MGM),23
18. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geo graphical Indications: Summary of Replies to the
Questionnaire on Trademark Law and Pradice (SCT/l1l6), SCT/14/5 Rev. (Nov. 1, 2005)
available at http://www.wipo.int/edoes/mdocs/set/en/set-14/sct_14_5 rev.pdt
19. THOMAS P. ARiEN, PROTECTION OF NONTRADITIONAL MARKS: TRADEMARK Riars iN
SoUNDs, SCENTS, COLORS, MOTONS AND PRoDucT DESIGN IN Tm U.S. (2000),
20. An August 28, 2009 search on TESS for 'RN >"O" returned 2,968,267 records. This is
the total number of registered trademarks on file with the PTO as of that date. The number of
nontraditional trademark registrations gathered from TESS was 452 as of August 28, 2009.
Therefore, the percentage of nontraditional trademark registrations on file with the PTO is a mere
0,015227%.
21 Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, http://www.wmitchell.edu/iitellectual-
property/?page=321&Mitchell+Study+on+-Trademark+ Litigation.
22. See Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims
Established/Not Established (2008), http://wwwx .wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/files/WM-
TMStudy-GraphB.pdf (comparing number of established claims to not established claims).
23. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion Corp., Reg. No. 1,395,550 ("The mark comprises a lion
roaring.").
HeinOnline  -- 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 5 2011
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
plumeria-scented yarn that came in a sealed kit to knit a skunk (well-known, that
is, among intellectual property people),24 or even the sound of a Harley Davidson
motorcycle while on idle.25 Some of the less known registered nontraditional
trademarks include the vertical opening motion of Lamborghini car door 6 or the
vertical spray of water from the back of a Yamaha personal watercraft.27
Applications for registration include some unusual things including the DNA
sequence for futurist Frank Ogden2 8 or anthropomorphic wilted flowers yelling
insults.29
Nontraditional marks may be registered in the United States because the
Lanham Act states that "any word, name symbol or device" that is used on or in
connection with some good or service may be registered if it has secondary
meaning.30 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this use of "any" as
actually meaning "any." 3' Therefore, the mere color alone of a green/gold press
24. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990); See also Celia Clarke, Reg. No.
1,639,128 ("The mark is a high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of plumeria blossoms.").
25. Harley-Davidson, Inc., Serial No. 74,485,223 ("The mark consists of the exhaust sound of
applicant's motorcycles, produced by V-Twin, common crankpin motorcycle engines when the
goods are in use.").
26. Automobile Lamborghini Holding S.p.A., Reg. No. 2,793,439 ("The mark consists of the
unique motion in which the door of a vehicle is opened. The doors move parallel to the body of the
vehicle but are gradually raised above the vehicle to a parallel position.").
27. Yamaha Hatsudoki Kabushiki Kaisha, U.S. Patent No. 1,946,170 ("The mark is comprised
of a three dimensional spray of water issuing from the rear of a jet propelled watercraft and is
generated during the operation of the watercraft."). See generally, Lesley Matty, Note, Rock,
Paper, Scissors, Trademark? A Comparative Analysis of Motion as a Feature of Trademarks in the
United States and Europe, 14 CARDozO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 557 (2006) (discussing motion marks).
A personal watercraft is more commonly called a "jet ski." However, JET SKI is actually the
registered trademark of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., U.S. Patent No. 1,394,547 (filed Jan. 20,
1984). Of course, this is not to be confused with Honda's AQUATRAX (U.S. Patent No.
2,737,518 (filed August 9, 2000).) or Bombardier Recreational Products' SEA-DOO (U.S. Patent
No. 3,705,331 (filed Feb. 3, 2005)).
28. Frank Ogden's trademark application claimed its identification of goods as follows: "DNA
GENE SEQUENCE TO PRODUCT [sic] FRANK OGDEN OR OTHER PROSPECTIVE
HUMANS, CLONES, SURVIVAL MACHINES, OR FUTURISTIC ANIMALS THAT ARE
USED TO CREATE IDEAS." U.S. Patent Serial No. 76,016,924 (filed April 3, 2000) (abandoned
Jan. 21, 2002). Frank Ogden maintains a web site at http://www.drtomorrow.com. Mr. Ogden's
registered trademark for Dr. TOMORROW was cancelled in 2004. U.S. Patent Serial No.
74,274,318 (filed May 11, 1992) (cancelled June 12, 2004). When asked, Frank Ogden responded
that the reason he attempted to register his own DNA sequence was because "I THOUGHT THAT
JUST THE LOOKING AT A PERSON AND BE WILLING TO PENETRATE THEIR DNA
WOULD REMOVE A LOT OF CONTROL OVER ANY TAXPAYER. I WANTED TO GET
THERE BEFORE SOME BUREAUCRAT GOT A BILL PASSED FOR THAT CONTROL." E-
mail to Frank Ogden (July 29, 2009) (on file with author).
29. U.S. Patent Serial No. 77,621,516 (filed Nov. 25, 2008) (abandoned Mar. 2, 2010). See
also Teleflora Brings Sassy Talking Flowers Super Bowl XLIII,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-OyOUN701-cg (video of the use of this mark in an
advertisement that aired during Super Bowl in 2009).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162-64
(1995).
31. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
6 [Vol. 38:1
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pad used in the laundry business was found to be a valid trademark.32 That is,
any "symbol or device" 33 that identifies source is a valid trademark in the United
States if it has secondary meaning.
This article argues that nontraditional trademarks should be denied
registration and be deemed unenforceable.34 Nontraditional trademarks are
functional. Nontraditional trademarks are subjective; what one person perceives
of the sensory mark is not what others perceive. As such, there can be no
reliable test for when the nontraditional mark is infringed or diluted. Courts
know this. Nontraditional marks succeed in trademark infringement or dilution
causes of action only 37% of the time 3 while trademark holders prevail nearly
50% of the time in all reported trademark causes of action since 1947.36
More importantly, the substantive harmonization of trademark laws around
the world, a contentious issue for 120 years, is proceeding. However, the
substantive harmonization is to an odd standard. There now is a movement
among WIPO countries to harmonize to the standard of protecting nontraditional
trademarks as opposed to preventing nontraditional trademarks from becoming
protectable.3 7 This is an odd movement because there have been so few
significant nontraditional trademark registrations in the United States and so few
nontraditional trademarks that are successfully enforced. Even if harmonized,
these numbers are so small that they could not possibly make any difference
whatsoever. Furthermore, this doctrinal harmonization will not be effective
because the underlying jurisprudence of trademark protection between the
United States and Civil Law countries will remain distinct.
Therefore, the goal of harmonization, which is to some degree to create
approximations between two or more systems to reduce transaction costs, will
not be recognized because the theory on which protection is based will remain
distinct and the numbers of possible nontraditional trademarks remain extremely
32. Id. at 166.
33. Id. at 162-63.
34. For purposes of this article, as product design or product configuration marks have become
mainstream, trade dress marks will not be considered nontraditional.
35. See Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-
property/?page=321 &Mitchell+Study+on+Trademark+Litigation (compiling and organizing
reported trademark cases).
36. Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims
Established/Not Established, http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-
GraphB.pdf.
37. World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States Agree to Move Ahead With
Efforts To Harmonize Trademark Law, http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/
html.jsp?file=/redocs/prdocs/en/2001/wipoupd 2001_154.html; World Intellectual Property
Organization, WIPO Member States Agree to Move Forward With Harmonization of Trademark
Law, http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/html.jsp?file=/redocs/prdocs/en/2002/wipoupd_2002
169.html; World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States Address Non-Traditional
Marks, Advance Work on Industrial Designs, http://www.wipo.int/pressroomi/en/articles/
2010/article_0024.html.
2011] 7
HeinOnline  -- 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 7 2011
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
small. As such, this harmonization is doomed to fail as it is numerically
infinitesimal and a misguided and mistrusted jurisprudence.
The United States is the only country in the world that protects "any" word,
name or even device as trademarks. Although Japan is considering legislation
that would extend trademark protection to nontraditional marks,3 8 no other
country has gone so far as to pass express legislation in this manner.39 The fact
that the United States' system of trademark jurisprudence conceptually supports
and validates nontraditional trademarks is a manifestation of how far the United
States is, conceptually, from the trademark laws of the Civil Law countries. That
is, by protecting "any" symbol or device, the United States trademark
jurisprudence is out of sync with the rest of the world. Although some countries
are attempting to doctrinally harmonize their trademark law to the peculiar
standard of protecting nontraditional trademarks, they will not succeed in
harmonizing trademark law in this area. There are so few nontraditional
trademarks that providing them protection will not affect anything in the larger
universe of trademark jurisprudence.
This is significant because most of the people on the planet do not live in
Common Law jurisdictions. In fact, as the following graphs 40 make explicit, the
vast majority of the world population lives in either strict Civil Law jurisdictions
or in some combination. Only a third of the world's population lives in strictly
Common Law countries, and even then registration plays a significant role in
trademark right generation. Less than a third of all countries are Common Law
nations.
38. ATARASHI TAIPUNO SHYOHYOUNI KANSURU CHOSAKENKYO HoKoKusHo [WHITE PAPER ON
NEW TYPES OF TRADEMARKS, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]
(2008), available at http://www.jpo.gojp/shiryou/toushin/chousa/pdf/zaisanken/
1907atarashiitypehonpen.pdf.
39. Kevin K. McCormick, "Ding" You are Now Free to Register Sound, 96 TRADEMARK REP.
1101, 1105-1109 (2006) (comparing United States' broad trademark protection to the European
Union). See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Summary of Replies to the
Questionnaire on Trademark Law and Practice (SCT/11/6), SCT/14/5 Rev. (Nov. 1, 2005)
(organizing and summarizing responses of member nations to trademark questionnaire) available at
http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/sctlen/sct_14/sct 14 5_rev.pdf
40. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2008).
8 [Vol. 38:1
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In the United States, the trademark right is a right of exclusion.4 1 One is
allowed to exclude others only to the extent one uses a mark and for long as one
uses the mark.4' In the Civil Law world, a trademark is much more. In countries
like France,43 Germany44 or Japan,45 the registered trademark is property.46 Ii
these countries, a trademark is, by definition, a registered mark.4 Registration
in Civil Law countries is harder to obtain than in the United States and registered
marks are nore difficult to lose. As the Civil Law of trademarks treats the
trademark as property and in the United States it is a mere right of exclusion, in
41. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edue. Expense 3d., 527 U.S 666, 673
(1999) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, i.. 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988)) See generally Keith
M- Stolte, How Earlv Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechte
Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 505, 506-07 (1998) (providi g a
comprehensive review and analysis of the "oldest reported trademark case in Anglo-American
law," which provides a bridge to medieval protection of guild marks and common law courts
marks)
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S 281, 325-28 (1988).
43 Terrance J. Keenan, Anerican and French Perspectives on Trademark Keying: The Courts
Leave Businesses Searching for Answers, 2 SHDLER J L. COM. & TiiC. 14, P24-P25 (2005),
44, Rudolf Rayle, The Trend Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners' Rights- A Comprirative
Study of .S and German Trademark Law, 7 J, INTE1.. PROP, L, 227, 270 (2000) ("[t]rademarks in
Gernany are property").
45. KENNETi L. PoRT, TRADEMARK AND UNInR CoMPrTIoN LAW AND POLICY IN JAPAN 5-6
(2007).
46. Section 4 of Council Regulation that established the CTIM system is titled "Conununity
Trademarks as Objects of Property" and Article 19 of the Regulation gives in rem jurisdiction over
trademarks. C ouncil Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J (JL 11) 1.
47. In Japan, for example, Article 18 or the Trademark Act says that the trademark right
subsists only upon registration. Trademark Act, Law No. 127 of 1959, art. 18 (Japan), translated
and available at http://www.japanieselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id-45&vm04&re=02. See
also Max Vern, A Trademark Visa -- Aspects ojlnternational Trademark Use and Protection, 88 1
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc 847, 848 (2006) ('[t]he tenet of the Civil Law system [is] that
there are no trademark rights Without a trademark registration"). See generally KENNEl I- PORT,
TIRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPlETION LAW AND POLICY IN JAPAN 77-81 (2007)(discussing
McDonald's late trademark registration and protection in Japan).
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the 125 years since the Paris Convention,48 the world has made nearly no
progress in harmonizing substantive trademark law. This lack of progress has
not been because countries were not trying.
In fact, much effort has been given to the job of harmonizing trademark
laws. 49  Success has been elusive,50 however, because the Civil Law of
trademarks is so conceptually disparate from the Common Law of trademarks.
To be meaningful, in harmonizing trademark law, both the theory and the
doctrine of trademark law must be harmonized." To merely adopt, for example,
a trademark system where rights are created by registration, as in the Civil Law
world, not by use, would be unconstitutional in the United States. That is, it
would take a constitutional amendment for the United States to grant rights
based on registration, not on use.
In fact, there are major and much more meaningful issues in substantive
trademark harmonization other than, for example, whether Japan will allow the
registration of the motion of a Lamborghini door. The world cannot agree on
when trademark rights are created. Is it upon use or upon registration? The
world cannot agree on when a trademark is or is not diluted. The world cannot
agree on what constitutes a famous mark and to what degree such a famous mark
48. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
828 U.N.T.S. 305.
49. See Edward Grosek, The Multilateral Agreements that Protect Trademarks and Marks that
Indicate Origins of Source, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 471 (2000) (compiling
international trademark law resources); Alejandro Guanes-Mersan, A General Comparative
Overview of Trademark Regulations Between the United States and Paraguay, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 775 (1999) (discussing international trademark laws as they affect the United States
and Paraguay); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1 (1998) (discussing harmonization of trademark laws); Jeffrey M. Samuels
& Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape ofInternational Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 433 (1994) (analyzing international treaties and their impact on national
trademark laws).
50. Two of the most significant attempts at harmonizing trademark law came in the form of the
Madrid Protocol and the TRIPs Agreement. See generally Steven Andreacola, Part Six:
Trademarks in the International Arena: International Conventions and Agreements: Lanham Act
Meets Madrid Protocol and Trademark Law Treaty: The Application Process, 12 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 489 (2001); Thies Bosling, Securing Trademark Protection in a Global Economy -
The United States' Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137
(2004); Charles Samuels, A Big Push Toward E-Government: The United States Patent and
Trademark Office and the Implementation of the Madrid Protocol, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 535
(2004); Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 433 (1994) (each reviewing the Madrid
Protocol) and Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection of Trademarks After the
TRIPS Agreement, 9 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 189 (1998) (reviewing TRIPs Agreement).
51. Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of Trademark Law: The
Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transnational Trademark Protection, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 309, 313 (2000) (explaining two inherent weaknesses in harmonization are (1) the differences
in legislative processes and (2) "inconsistencies in the meaning and application of the law").
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deserves cross border protection.5 2 The world is morbidly fixed to the notion of
territoriality of trademark laws. All these issues are far more meaningful than
whether a country protects the motion of the spray of water behind a personal
watercraft."
As subjective aesthetic indicators, nontraditional marks do not fulfill any
justifications for trademark protection. When a mark satisfies the justifications
for trademark protection, it becomes appropriate to grant the trademark holder a
right to exclude others from using the mark.54 It makes competitive sense to do
this because we want and need companies to invest in trademarks to lower the
transaction costs of purchasing goods and services. 5s For example, the stronger
the mark, the lower the search costs consumers incur when attempting to buy a
56
product they like or want.
However, nontraditional marks do not lower transaction costs. In fact, as
they are subjective and indefinite, they actually increase transaction costs for the
consumer. As such, they are inappropriate trademark subject matter as they do
not further the purpose of trademark protection. They also waste scarce
resources of the PTO. As nontraditional trademarks are a very rare breed,
harmonizing to this standard is a curious development for a world where
trademark laws and policies are so distinct. As the harmonization efforts that
exist regarding nontraditional marks are only on a doctrinal level and not a
theoretical level, the idea of trademark protection will remain disparate and
distinct, even if some countries harmonize doctrine to allow for the protection of
nontraditional trademarks.
III. HISTORY OF THE WORDS "SYMBOL" AND "DEVICE"
Today, nontraditional trademarks are deemed protectable as they constitute
either a "symbol" or a "device"57 as used in the Lanham Act.58 To determine the
52. Alexis Weissberger, Note: Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An
International Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739 (2006).
53. Personal Watercrafts (PWC) are very popular in the United States with approximately 20
million Americans riding them each year and annoyingly zipping around lakes and rivers, which
are otherwise quiet and peaceful bodies of water. In 2005 there were 1.55 million PWCs in use
throughout the country. PWC sales generate a considerable amount of revenue each year in the
United States. In 2005, the industry grossed $7.6 million in sales and sold more than 80,000 units.
Personal Watercraft Industry Association, Personal Watercraft Sales,
http://www.pwia.org/faq/sales.aspx (last visited October 1, 2009).
54. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1988) (illustrating how trademarks are helpful for identification).
55. Id at 270-71. But see Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (2004) (criticizing the economic analysis of trademark law).
56. Landes & Posner, supra note 54 at 270-71; but see Beebe, supra note 55 (criticizing the
economic analysis of trademark law).
57. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson Lalonde, 1-2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.11[l] (2010);
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) ("Since human beings might use as
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appropriateness of this determination, it is instructive to trace the history of the
use of the words "symbol" and "device" as they have been used in the definition
of trademarks over time.59 When viewed from a historical context, these words,
as originally construed, did not support the notion of nontraditional trademarks.
Professor Lars Smith is correct when he claims that the use of the word
"device" in the definition of trademarks was in the original Lanham Act; o
however, it did not start there. In fact, it appears that use of the words "symbol"
and "device" as part of a definition of a trademark originally appeared in an
English case from 1836. It is made confusing because "device" was not used in
the definition of a trademark6 2 in any of the trademark legislation that preceded
the Lanham Act and "symbol" was only used in the Act of 1920.63 Both the
terms "symbol" and "device" are derived from a concept much older than the
modem trademark laws.
The earliest known use of the words "symbol" and "device" to define a
trademark occurred in the English case of Knott v. Morgan in 1836.64 In this
case, the London Conveyance Company operated "omnibuses," horse drawn bus-
like vehicles, pictured below, in London. 5 Morgan, the defendant, used the
terms CONVEYANCE COMPANY and LONDON CONVEYANCE
COMPANY on competing omnibuses.66 Morgan also used a green and gold star
and garter type symbol, pictured below.67 The plaintiff had been using a similar
symbol with similar coloring for some time prior to the defendant.
a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language,
read literally, is not restrictive.").
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
59. Professor Glynn Lunney has argued in multiple places that these words in the Lanham Act
do not indicate Congressional support of the protection of trade dress. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal
Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2000) (arguing that trade dress is a judicial creation and not a
legislative one); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373-91 (1999).
As nontraditional trademarks are another form of trade dress, presumptively, Lunney would agree
that nontraditional trademarks, by definition, should not fall within the definition of a trademark
under the Lanham Act.
60. Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia's Tertium Quid Trade Dress
Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 243, 247 (2005).
61. Knott v. Morgan, 48 Eng. Rep. 610 (1836); FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TRADE MARKS 94-100 (1860) [hereinafter UPTON].
62. "Device" appeared in pre-Lanham Act legislation, however, "device" did not appear in any
laws passed by Congress before the Lanham Act. See H.R. 2283, 77th Cong. (1942) (including the
word "device") available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/trademarks/
PreLanhamAct_019HR_2283.pdf.
63. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, available at http://ipmall.info/hostedresources/lipal
trademarks/PreLanhamAct_087 Act..of_1920.pdf.
64. Knott v. Morgan, 48 Eng. Rep. 610 (1836); UPTON, supra note 61.
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The English court held that the plaintiff did not have exclusive rights in or to
the words "London Conveyance Company" or "Conveyance Company," but it
did deserve an injunction because of the defendant's use of these words in
conjunction with the same or similar symbols.69 The defendant was enjoined
using the same symbols and:
[F]rom running, or in any manner using or causing to be used, for the
conveyance of psssengers [sic], his omnibus in the bill mentioned, or
any other omnibus, having painted, stamped, printed, or written thereon
the words or names "London Conveyance," or "Original Conveyance
for Company," or any other names, words, or devices painted, stamped,
printed, or written thereon, in such manner as to form or be a colourable
imitation of the names, words and devices painted, stamped, printed, or
written on the omnibuses of the Plaintiffs ... 70
In this case, the word "device" and/or "symbol" does not relate to any
nontraditional trademark." In fact, the word "device" is used synonymously
with the words "design mark." 72 That is, it merely identifies the colors and
shapes of the star and garter type symbol as depicted below.
The first known case where the word "device" appears in the United States
in a trademark case was in 1840." In Bell v. Locke, the court held that the
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN NEW ERA newspaper trademark was not
infringed by NEW ERA newspaper. The court found that a distinguishing
feature was the fact that the defendant used a large portrait of "a Bird of Jove"75
and the plaintiff used a rather modest picture of an eagle in conjunction with
69. Id. at 613.
70. Id. at 613-14.
71. See Knott v. Morgan, 48 Eng. Rep. 610 (1836); UPTON, supra note 61 (using the words
"device" and "symbol").
72. Id.
73. See Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige Ch. 75 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (using the word "device").
74. Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige Ch. 75 (N.Y. Ch. 1840).
75. An eagle.
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their word marks. The court stated as follows: "But surely no one can mistake
the wide-spread wings and the warlike attitude of 'the bird of Jove,' which
occupies so large a space in the heading of the defendant's paper, for the very
modest device which sustains the Democratic Republicanism of the
complainant's New Era." 77
Clearly, in this case the word "device" was meant to indicate the plaintiffs
design mark7 8 that consisted of an eagle that provided a distinguishing feature to
the defendant's use of the word marks. The "device" spoken of, seems to be the
relative eagles alone or the relative eagles in conjunction with the relative word
marks.79 There was no mention of the word "symbol."80 Regardless, the word
"device" is synonymous here with "design mark," the words we would use today
to describe such a trademark.
In 1844, the Circuit Court of Massachusetts characterized the packaging
used to identify the plaintiffs thread as "devices." 8 ' The court agreed with the
initial bill and found the following:
[T]he defendant has extensively manufactured and sold spurious threads
of inferior quality, put up on spools similar to those used by
complainants, and colored, stamped and labeled, and enclosed in
envelopes resembling exactly the spools, labels, devices, trade marks
and envelopes used by the complainants; that this conduct of the
defendant has greatly injured the complainants, not only by depriving
them of the profits on the sale of large quantities of their own threads,
but by the prejudice to the reputation of the article manufactured by
them, caused by the inferior quality of the threads sold by the
defendant. 82
In this case, the use of the word "device" seems to mean the entire
conglomeration of things that the plaintiff did to differentiate its goods from
others. To be sure, the colors red and black were part of this device, but, just as
assuredly, not as used separately from this overall source identifying device.
The next occurrence of the word "device" used in relationship to a trademark
in the United States was in 1846.x This time, the Chancery Court of New York
refused to enjoin the defendant's use of a bee-hive and foliage mark on a match
box because the plaintiff s mark was made slovenly and the defendant's "device"
76. Bell, 8 Paige Ch. at 77.
77. Id.
78. A design mark consists of graphics in place of or in addition to letters to identify source.
See Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (involving duck
graphics with the names of tour companies).
79. See Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige Ch. 75 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (comparing the newspapers).
80. Id.
81. Taylor v. Carpenter, 3 Story 458, 23 F.Cas. 742 (1844).
82. Taylor v. Carpenter, 3 Story 458, 23 F.Cas. 742 (1844).
83. See Patridge v. Menck, 2 Sand. Ch. 622 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (using the word "device");
UPTON, supra note 61, at 34-36.
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was made elegantly.84 In this case, as in all of the above cases regarding device,
the court calls a "device" what a court or commentator today would call a
"design mark."85
The word "symbol" does not appear in the cases from 1836 until 1849. In
the 1849 case, Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear,16 the court clearly claims that the
definition of trademarks should extend to "symbols" as follows:
Every manufacturer and every merchant for whom goods are
manufactured, has an unquestionable right to distinguish the goods that
he manufactures or sells, by a peculiar mark or device, in order that
they may be known as his in the market for which he intends them, and
that he may thus secure the profits that their superior repute as his, may
be the means of gaining.
The owner of an original trade mark, has an undoubted right to be
protected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms or symbols that
were appropriated as designating the true origin or ownership of the
article or fabric to which they were affixed; but he has no right to an
exclusive use of any words, letters, figures or symbols, which have no
relation to the origin or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to
indicate their name or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or
symbol which, from the nature of the fact which it is used to signify,
others may employ with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to
87employ, for the same purpose.
In 1853 the Supreme Court of New York that the definition of trademark
would include both the word "symbol" and "device:" 88
The principle is well settled that a manufacturer may, by priority of
appropriation of names, letters, marks, or symbols of any kind, to
distinguish his manufactures, acquire a property therein, as a trade
mark, for the invasion of which an action for damages will lie; and in
the exclusive use of which he may have protection, when necessary, by
injunction. . . . In all cases where names, signs, marks, brands, labels,
words or devices of any kind can be advantageously used to designate
the goods or property, or particular place of business, of a person
engaged in trade or manufacture, or any similar business, he may adopt
and use such as he pleases, which are adapted to that end and have not
been before appropriated; and no other person can lawfully imitate
84. Patridge v. Menck, 2 Sand. Ch. 622 (N.Y. Ch. 1846); UPToN,supra note 61, at 34-36.
85. See Patridge v. Menck, 2 Sand. Ch. 622 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (using the word "device" to
describe the image on a matchbox).
86. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. NY 599 (1849); UPTON, supra note 61, at 85-126.
87. Id. at 605-06; UPToN, supra note 61, at 86.
88. Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853); UPTON, supra note 61, at 87.
2011]1 15
HeinOnline  -- 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 15 2011
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
them, and by that means sell his own goods or property, or carry on his
business, as the goods, property or business of the former.89
By 1860, Francis H. Upton, the primary trademark commentator of the day,
reported that the definition of trademark included both the words "device" and
"symbol."90 "A trade mark is the name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device,
adopted and used, by a manufacturer, or merchant, in order to designate the
goods that he manufactures, or sells ... 91
In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court gave trademarks the expansive definition
that is very similar to the definition used by courts today. 92  In McLean v.
Fleming, the Court defined a trademark as "a name, symbol, figure, letter, form,
or device . . . ."
Subsequently, in 1878, another trademark commentator of the time, Charles
E. Coddington, defined the trademark in the following terms: "A trademark is a
name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device, adopted and used by a manufacturer
or merchant to designate the goods he manufactures or sells and to distinguish
them from the goods of another." 94
One of the earliest reported alleged nontraditional trademark case where
"device" was used to describe the trademark was A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v.
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.95 In this case, a red stripe was placed on wire
rope.96  It was this colored strand that was claimed to be the plaintiffs
trademark." The United States Supreme Court held that color alone was too
indefinite to constitute a trademark.98  The court called the colored strand
imprecisely defined and "manifestly too broad."99
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, in referring to trademarks as a
"device," the court held that "[t]he product including the coloring matter is free
to all who can make it if no extrinsic deceiving element is present.', Although
89. Id.
90. UPTON, supra note 61, at 9.
91. UPTON, supra note 61, at 9.
92. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (describing a trademark as "a name,
symbol, figure, letter, form, or device").
93. McLeav v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (citing UPTON, supra note 61 as controlling
authority).
94. CHARLES E. CODDINGTON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS § 22 (1878). As support
for this proposition, the author relies on the following cases: (1869) Phila. Ct. of Com. Pleas.,
Ferguson v. Davol Mills, 7 Phila. 253; S. C., 2 Brewster 314. However, these cases could not be
located and appear lost.
95. See A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 (1906)
(using the word "device").
96. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 170
(1906).
97. Id. at 170.
98. Id. at 170. "Whether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark may admit of doubt." Id.
at 171.
99. Id. at 171.
100. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920).
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the mark COCA-COLA has secondary meaning, it did not give the plaintiff a
right to prevent the use of "dope" as used on a brown, bubbly beverage.of
All of this significant use of the words "device" and "symbol" to define a
trademark did not motivate the drafters of the Trademark Acts of 1870,102
1876,to3 1881,104 1882, os 1905, o0 or 1920107 to include the word "device" in
defining a trademark and only the Trademark Act of 1920 108 used the word
"symbol." Therefore, when the Lanham Act takes up the yoke of "symbol" and
"device,,109 it had some common law history on which to rely; however, that
history actually teaches away from the current broad understanding of these
words.110  Most importantly, in 1988 Congress expressly "expanded"11 the
definition of a trademark and retained "symbol or device" "so as not to preclude
the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they function
as trademarks."112
The problem, of course, was that "symbol" and "device" had almost
exclusively meant design marks, not nontraditional trademarks."' In the only
case where it seems to have been used to define color strips as used on rope, the
Court rejected that claim as too broad.'14 Then, in 1995, when the Supreme
Court relied on this very language to claim that color alone is appropriate subject
101. Id. at 147.
102. Trade--Mark Act of 1870, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/
trademarks/PreLanhamAct_082 Act-of 1870.pdf.
103. Trade--Mark Act of Aug. 14, 1876, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/1ipa/
trademarks/PreLanhamAct_083 Act of 1876.pdf.
104. Trade--Mark Act of Mar. 3, 1881, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/
trademarks/PreLanhamAct_084 Act of 1881.pdf.
105. Trade--Mark Act of Aug. 5, 1882, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/
trademarks/PreLanhamAct 085 Act of 1882.pdf.
106. Trade--Mark Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 15 U.S.C. §§ 81-108, available at
http://ipmall.info/hostedresources/lipa/ trademarks/PreLanhamAct 086_Act of_1905.pdf.
107. Trade--Mark Act of 1920, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/
lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct_087 Act of_1920.pdf.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or
device. . . .").
110. See supra Part III.
111. In a Senate Report accompanying the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 Congress
expressed its intent to broaden the definition of "trademark" and retain "symbol and device" to
encompass nontraditional trademarks such as color, sound, etc. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 44 (1988).
112. Id. See also The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission
Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP.
375, 421 (Sept.-Oct. 1987) (expressing intent to allow registration of things "such things as a color,
shape, smell, sound, or configuration which functions as a mark"); Moon-Ki Chai, Note, Protection
of Fragrances Under the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 368, 371-72 (July-
Aug. 1990) ("The Committee 'determined that the terms 'symbol, or device' should not be deleted
or narrowed to preclude registration of such things as color, shape, smell, sound, or configuration
which functions as a mark.").
113. See supra Part III.
114. See A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 (1906)
(rejecting claim).
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matter for a trademark, it is not difficult to see how people might conclude that
this was a "stunning breakthrough" for nontraditional trademarks."'
Little in the etymological history of the words "symbol" and "device" hints
at the expansive meaning now ascribed to those terms.116 In historical terms,
these words have changed from meaning a design mark to now meaning the
vertical motion of a car door opening or the vertical spray of water from the back
of a personal water craft."' As Congress expressly admitted in 1988, this is an
"expansion" of what heretofore had been the trademark right."'8 As Gilson says,
this is "stunning.""H9 In context, this expansion is not explained or warranted.
As persuasive plaintiff attorneys gradually made their cases, the expansion
occurred. This expansion can be ascribed to the persuasive powers of the
common law lawyer, not to any particular legislative enactment. In this context,
we can see that the Qualitex'20 case was a radical departure from the 150 years of
common law case history that preceded it. 12 1
IV. COLOR
The issue of registering nontraditional marks received a major incentive
when the Supreme Court held that there was no per se rule against color alone
being granted trademark status.122 In Qualitex v. Jacobson, the Supreme Court
flippantly dismissed objections to color alone being a trademark that had stood
for decades. 12 3
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court determined that the previous belief that there
was a "per se" rule against granting trademark protection for color alone was in
error.124 In Qualitex, Justice Bryer's opinion squarely addresses whether or not a
color alone may be suitable trademark subject matter.12 5  Justice Breyer
concluded that because the Lanham Act says "any word, name, symbol, or
device" may be a valid trademark, as long as it acts to identify source, color
alone may also play the role of a valid trademark.126
Although taken for granted now in the United States and sometimes
misstated, 12 7 the United States remains the only jurisdiction in the world to so
115. See Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 4.
116. See supra Part III.
117. See supra notes 26-27.
118. See supra note l 11.
119. See Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 4.
120. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
121. See supra Part III.
122. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159.
123. Id. See infra Part XIII.
124. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1995).
125. Id.
126. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
127. See Glenda Labadie-Jackson, Through the Looking Hole of the Multi-Sensory Trademark
Rainbow: Trademark Protection of Color Per Se Across Jurisdictions: The United States, Spain
and the European Union, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 91, 92 (2008) (omitting the word "device"
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broadly recognize rights in color alone.128  The European Union, the World
Intellectual Property Organization and the Madrid Protocol' 2 9 all arguably allow
for and make specific provisions for the registration of color alone as a
trademark, however, judicial support in that context is sparse.130
In the United States, registration of color alone is justified by categorizing it
as a "device" under the Lanham Act.13' This was contemplated when the
Lanham Act was amended in 1988.132 That is, because the statutory definition of
a trademark now includes the terms "symbol or device," and this no longer
means "design mark," the possibility of registering things, such as color, that are
not traditional word marks is supported by the statute itself.33
This result has been harshly criticized by commentators. Perhaps the most
persuasive and direct attack came recently from Ann Bartow.' 34  Professor
Bartow argued that color alone should not be recognized as a trademark.13 5 To
do so, she argues, allows companies to monopolize the aesthetic and
communicative attributes of color.' 3 6  Given that color is also inherently
functional and the consequent uncertainties created by protecting color,
Professor Bartow would never allow color alone to act as a trademark.13 7
Professor Bartow seems correct. Protecting color per se seems to extend the
trademark beyond where it is needed to encourage use by corporations to reduce
transaction costs. More importantly, though, color alone is not a frequently
from the quoted section of the Lanham Act).
128. See supra notes 126-27.
129. Labadie-Jackson , supra note 127 at 101-06; Jaume Pellise Capell & Maria Teresa
Solanelles Battle, La Proteccion del Color Unico como Marca en el Derecho Comunitario,
REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 1101,1123-1124 (1998).
130. See, e.g., Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, Case C-104/01 (Eur. Ct. Justice
May 6, 2003), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search for Case no. "C-104/01")
(rejecting validity of color trademark).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
132. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 134, 102 Stat. 3935, 3947
(1988) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)); S. REP. No. 100-515 at 44 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607 ("The revised definition intentionally retains ... (iv) the words
'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations
where they function as trademarks.") See also, Glynn S. Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor's New
Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong On The Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131,
1191-92 (2000) ("Rather than choosing an affirmative statement ('so as to include') that would
suggest that Congress intended to resolve the issue, the Senate Report chose a negative phrasing
('so as not to preclude'). This choice suggests that Congress was neither foreclosing nor requiring
the registration of such material.").
133. For the argument that "force-fitting" trade dress into the word "device" is inappropriate,
see id.
134. Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti
Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263 (2009).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 289-90.
137. Id.
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litigated subject matter, even though the Court in Qualitex seemed to believe it
was worthy of Supreme Court attention. 13 8
Virtually all of the reported cases regarding nontraditional trademarks are
litigation over color.139 Of the total reported cases since 1947, less than 1% of
the total claim color alone as a trademark;14 0 however, of the 35 nontraditional
trademark cases reported 30 (86%) of them are about color.' 4 1 Although there
are 345 trademark applications for color alone (44% of the total), 152 of these
marks (nearly 45%) were either abandoned before they reached registration or
were cancelled for nonuse once registered. 142 It takes on average 37 months to
obtain a registration for a color mark.'4 3 Therefore, it appears that commentators
and courts alike exaggerate the significance of this nontraditional trademark.
Arguably, color may be the least subjective of the nontraditional trademarks.
Using the Pantone Matching System, a color-coding system, subjectivity may by
lessened.1" This coding system gives every shade of every color a number.145
138. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
139. See Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-
property/?page=32 1&Mitchell+Study+on+Trademark+Litigation (compiling and organizing
reported trademark cases).
140. See DAP Prods., Inc. v. Color Tile Mfg., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Chinese Arts & Crafts, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pennwalt Corp. v.
Zenith Labs., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex
Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Transp., Inc. v. Mayflower Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d
952 (4th Cir. 1985); Am. Basketball Ass'n v. AMF Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Barnes Group, Inc. v. Connell Ltd. P'ship, 793 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Del. 1992); Emba Mink Breeders
Ass'n v. United Mink Producers Ass'n, 224 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. Wis. 1963); Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Plastilite Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co., 390 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Neb. 1975);
Schmidt Mfg. Co. of S.C. v. Sherrill Indus., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.N.C. 1965); Sylvania
Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Or. 1985); Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage
Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); W.H. Brady Co. v. Lem Prods., Inc., 659 F. Supp.
1355 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Customer Co., 947 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834 (E.D. Va. 1998); Bd. of
Supervisors of La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. La. 2006);
Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc. v. Midstates Distrib. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 901 (C.D. Ill. 2002);
Pearson Indus., Inc. v. Pet Friendly, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Unique Sports Prods., Inc. v. Babolat VS, 403 F. Supp.
2d 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D.N.J.
1999); Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2002); Deere &
Co. v. MTD Holdings, Inc., No. 00 Civ 5936 (LMM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2550 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
18, 2004); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1995); Rainbow Play Sys.,
Inc. v. GroundScape Techs., LLC, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Minn. 2005); Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1997); Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 777 F.
Supp. 744 (D. Minn. 1991) (each involving disputes over color as a trademark).
141. Id.
142. See infra app. C.
143. See infra app. D.
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The Pantone Matching System is an internationally recognized color-coding
system. 46 Pantone Corporation lists over 1000 colors and it has assigned each
color a number code.147  This allows Pantone to match colors uniformly
worldwide.14 8 Therefore, one might claim Pantone Matching System 300, which
is a blue color. However, for Thrifty, Inc., claiming this number was not enough
to overcome an Examiner's rejection based on a claim that the Applicant failed
to provide an adequate description of the mark.14 9
However, even if the subjectivity of color marks is lessened with the Pantone
Matching System, its use in American trademark law would be limited. Context
is an important factor considering whether a mark is infringed. That is, courts
will not tolerate taking a mark out of context and, for example, doing a side-by-
side comparison to determine if the two marks are confusingly similar.so
Therefore, although it is, of course possible to run two different colors through a
spectrograph to determine similarity, no court would admit that into evidence.
To determine similarity, the mark must be viewed as consumers confront the
mark in the marketplace.'"' Consumers do not look at the color of a product
through a spectrograph before making a purchase; therefore, it would not be
admissible.
V. SOUND
There have been 336 applications for sound before the PTO.152  This
amounts to over 43% of all nontraditional trademarks. 53 Sound and color (44%)
make up 87% of all nontraditional trademarks.154 Four of the 35 reported cases
(11%) are sound marks and the plaintiff has prevailed only once.'
The PTO apparently thinks rather lightly of sound marks as the only list of
these marks appears in the "Kids" section of the PTO web site which also
includes things like games, puzzles other links, and the most peculiar looking




149. In re Thrifty, 274 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (sustaining rejection where applicant's
claimed color blue on a wall was materially altered when applied to several other objects).
150. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092, 1095 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
151. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1980).
152. See infra app.A.
153. See infra app. A.
154. See infira app. A.
155. See Louis Rich, Inc. v. Horace W. Longacre, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(enjoining defendant "from using term 'gobble-gobble' in the advertising of any processed turkey
product .... ); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (denying plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief); G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp.
2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (dismissing plaintiffs claims).
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piracy."' The peculiar part is that the character appears to be attractive to a
child interested in pirates, but the content of that portion of the site is clearly
intended for someone well educated in the art of knock-off goods.'57
Figure 1: PTO's Graphic User Interface for Children of "Pirated" Marks158
It certainly appears that the registrants or applicants do not take these
applications as lightly as the PTO does. Reviewing the application records using
the TARR (Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval) database of the
PTO discloses the fact that applicants for sound marks do not have an easy time
obtaining registrations. 59 It takes an average of just under 24 months to obtain a
trademark registration after application.160 The average pendency for all marks
is 13.9 months.16 ' These applications are often refused for being functional or
for failing to function as a trademark that can be used to identify and distinguish
applicant's goods from others and to identify source.162  That is, it takes
significantly more time and therefore costs significantly more to obtain a
registration for a sound mark rather than a traditional mark.
Perhaps the most famous case involving a claimed sound as a trademark
occurred in 1994 when Harley Davidson filed a trademark application for the
sound of its motorcycle idling. 6 3 In the application, Harley Davidson described
this sound as saying the word "potato", slowly, over and over.'6 Harley
156. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Kids Pages, http://www.uspto.gov/go/kids/
157. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Kids - Stop Piracy,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/kidantipiracy.htm
158. Whoever in the PTO dreamed up this graphic certainly doesn't have kids.
159. See infra app. B.
160. See infra app. D.
161. In 2008 it took an average of 13.9 months to get a traditional mark from application to
registration. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Table 15: Summary of Trademark
Examining Activities, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/oai_05-wlt_ 1 5.html.
162. Michael B. Sapherstein, The Trademark Registerability of the Harley-Davidson Roar: A
Multimedia Analysis, 1998 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 101101 (1998) available at
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/iptflarticles/content/1998101101.html.
163. Harley-Davidson, Inc., U.S. Patent Serial No. 74,485,223 (filed Feb. 1, 1994) ("The mark
consists of the exhaust sound of applicant's motorcycles, produced by V-Twin, common crankpin
motorcycle engines when the goods are in use.").
164. Id See also Jodie Dejonge, Harley Seeks Protection for its 'Spudly' Sound: Distinctive
Motorcycle Engine Revs Up Trademark Concerns, The Seattle Times, March 28, 1996, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960328&slug-2321321 (Harley
22 [Vol. 38:1
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Davidson applied for this mark in 1994, it was allowed by the PTO in 1995 and
five years later in 2000 it was expressly abandoned by Harley Davidson after
several parties, including Suzuki, Honda, Kawasaki and Polaris, filed
oppositionsl 6 5 and three months before the TTAB sustained those oppositions.16 6
One of the first sound trademarks to be registered in the United States was
filed in 1970 by NBC Universal, Inc. for the now famous "NBC chimes." 67
The identification of goods for this registration reads as follows:
THE MARK COMPRISES A SEQUENCE OF CHIME-LIKE
MUSICAL NOTES WHICH ARE IN THE KEY OF C AND SOUND
THE NOTES G, E, C, THE "G" BEING THE ONE JUST BELOW
MIDDLE C, THE "E" THE ONE JUST ABOVE MIDDLE C, AND
THE "C" BEING MIDDLE C, THEREBY TO IDENTIFY
APPLICANT'S BROADCASTING SERVICE.168
Of course, some sound marks have attained an iconic reputation. Everyone
knows the roar of the MGM lion, 69 first used in 1924,170 and the Harlem
Globetrotters whistling the song Sweet Georgia Brown, 17 1 first used in 1948.172
However, few people would recognize "'Hisamitsu' sung over the sound of four
musical tones, E, A, E, and F sharp. The first three notes being eighth notes and
the final note being a tied eighth and half note," for medicated transdermal
patches173 or the loon call of the Minnesota State Lottery.174 That is, few have
become iconic, like the Menards song about how we can all "Save Big Money at
Menards." 75  Most of the trademark applications or registrations for sound
marks went the way of Anheuser-Busch's howling wolf.176 In fact, of the 336
Davidson's attorney giving the verbal description of that mark as a very fast "potato-potato-
potato"); Nick Pisarsky, NOTE: PoTAYto-PoTAHto-Let's Call the Whole Thing Off Trademark
Protection of Product Sounds, 40 CONN. L. REv. 797, 806 (2008) (discussing the Harley-Davidson
sound mark).
165. See supra note 163.
166. For a chronology, see United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board Inquiry System, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pnam=NOSTALGIA%
20MOTORCYCLE%20CO.,%2OINC.%20%20 (including dates and prosecution history).
167. NBC Universal, Inc., Reg. No. 916,522, available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?
regser-serial&entry=72349496&action=Request+Status.
168. Id.
169. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion Corp., Reg. No. 1,395,550, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-73553567&action=Request+Status.
170. Id.
171. Harlem Globetrotters International, Inc., Reg. No. 1,700,895 available
athttp://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-74158626&action=Request+Status.
172. Id.
173. Hisamitsu Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., Reg. No. 2,814,082 available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry=78101339&action=Request+Status.
174. Minnesota State Lottery Agency, Reg. No. 2,600,195, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry=760772 11 &action=Request+Status.
175. Menard, Inc., Reg. No. 2,723,532, available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?
regser-serial&entry-76368849&action=Request+Status.
176. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Reg. No. 2,207,874, available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?
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. sound mark applications in the 62-year history of the Lanham Act, 28 were
cancelled for nonuse of the registered mark and 112 were abandoned before they
reached the registration stage.'7 7
Sound marks constitute 43% of all nontraditional mark applications, yet 140
of the initial 336 applications didn't survive to registration or were cancelled
thereafter.17 8 Very few would be deemed "famous" under the Dilution Act.'
VI. SCENT
The most popular case where the scent of a product was recognized as a
trademark was In re Clarke.80  In this case, Celia Clarke, doing business as
Clarke's OSEWEZ, produced a yarn that smelled like plumeria flowers.' The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found the scent to be distinctive of the yarn,
possessed secondary meaning and, therefore, upheld Mrs. Clarke's application to
register the mark as used on kits where the purchaser would knit a skunk that
smelled like plumeria.182
Perhaps no American has played a larger role in getting scents recognized as
trademarks than James E. Hawes. Hawes first advocated for the registration of
scent trademarks in 1989.183 Hawes represented Cecilia Clarke in her petition
before the TTAB to register the scent of her yarn in 1990.184 Unfortunately for
Hawes, on September 29, 1997, Clarke's registered trademark for the plumeria
scented thread was canceled by the PTO for a failure to file a Continuing Use
Affidavit under Section 8 of the Lanham Act.185 That is, the mark was cancelled
for nonuse.
It appears that the registration for the scent of Clarke's yarn was more
significant for Hawes than it was for Clarke. Although this case is depicted by
some as a major breakthrough that others ought to follow,'8 6 very few applicants
have, in fact, obtained trademark registrations for scents and in other places this
regser-serial&entry-75086922&action=Request+Status.
177. See infra app. C.
178. See infra app. C.
179. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 177 (2002); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (fame is ephemeral in nature and difficult to identify, which
is why Congress laid out multiple factors including "(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach
of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third
parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under
the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the mark was registered
under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.")
180. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990)L
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. James E. Hawes, Fragrances as Trademark, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 134 (1989).
184. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
185. Celia Clarke, Reg. No. 1,639,128, available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/
tarr?regser-serial&entry=73758429.
186. Faye M. Hammersley, Comment, The Smell of Success: Trade Dress Protection for Scent
Marks, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 105 (1998).
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idea has been harshly criticized.187 In fact, there are currently only 12 registered
trademarks for scents in the United States and only 28 applications.18 8 Nine of
the 28 applications have either been abandoned or subsequently cancelled for
nonuse. 89 It takes an average of 26 months to obtain a registration.190 There are
no reported cases where a scent trademark was at issue.
In fact, lessons from osphresiology, the science of smells, teach us that
scents are inappropriate for trademark protection. The actual scent that one
recognizes is affected by temperature and humidity.'9' Therefore, not only is the
scent that is projected from an article different according to these and other
variables, the receiver also does not sense the same scent from time to time.192
Human beings have an enormous capacity to remember sounds and sights. The
human brain can only remember sixteen smells for a long period of time. 93
Also, science has not determined the role that, for example, simple cold remedies
such as Zicam can play in impairing one's sense of smell.194
Few scent marks are registered in European Union.' 95 The "smell of fresh
cut grass," for example, has been issued for use on tennis balls. 96
Therefore, because scents are perceived differently over time and because
each person's subjective olfactory sense differs based, for example, on whether
one has a cold or not,197 scent trademarks do not possess the incident of
consistency that is required to make a scent worthy of trademark protection.
VII. TASTE
To date, there have been nine trademark applications in the United States for
taste.198 Thus far, no registrations have been issued' 99 and all nine applications
187. Douglas D. Churovich, Intellectual Property: Policy Considerations From A
Practitioner's Perspective: Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the Lanham Act Scientific
Obstacles to Scent Marks, 20 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 293 (2001).
188. See infra app. A.
189. See infra app. C.
190. See infra app. D.
191. Churovich, supra note 187, at 301.
192. Churovich, supra note 187, at 302.
193. Churovich, supra note 187, at 302.
194. See Saundra Young, FDA Warns Against Using 3 Popular Zicam Cold Meds, CNN
Online, June 16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/06/16/zicam.fda.waming/index.html
(reporting on the drug's potential threat to cause loss of sense of smell).
195. See Katerina Shaw, Likelihood of Coexistence: A Comparative Analysis of the Interplay
Between European Trademark Law and Free Competition, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 51, 69
(2009) (discussing EU's reluctance to grant trademark protection to a scent).
196. Vennootschap onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing, Trade mark No. 428870, available
at http://oami.europa.eulCTMOnline/RequestManager (search for Trade mark No. 428870); Case
No. R 156/1998-2, Vennootschap onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing, [1999] E.T.M.R. 429
(Eur. Comm. Trade Marks Office, 2d Board of Appeal Feb. 11, 1999) available at
http://oami.europa.eu/legaldocs/boa/1998/EN/RO156_1998-2.pdf.
197. Churovich, supra note 187, at 303-04.
198. See infra app. A.
199. See infra app. A.
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have been abandoned.2 00 Although a flavor may be a "device" under the Lanham
Act and therefore not statutorily barred, no one has convinced a court or the PTO
that a flavor deserves trademark protection. 20 1 The best case for flavor
trademarks apparently is in the pharmaceutical industry.2 02
In a very closely watched case by flavor lovers, N.V. Organon, a Dutch
company, failed to convince the TTAB that its flavor orange deserved trademark
protection on antidepressant medication. 20 3
Organon had argued that its orange flavor was a different orange flavor than
other medicines on the market with an orange flavor.2 0 It argued that the orange
flavor has nothing to do with the product itself.205 It did not make the product
cheaper or stronger or weaker in dosage.206 It also argued that doctors when
prescribing the drug do not concern themselves with the flavor of the drug.207
Organon also argued that the orange flavor did not affect the function of the
medication-regardless of how it tastes, the medicine still works the same.208
The TTAB disagreed. 20 9 The TTAB held that the orange flavor could not
function as a trademark because pharmaceutical companies add flavor to their
medicines on a frequent basis. 210 Organon did not attempt to register a distinct
flavor of orange; it attempted to register the flavor orange. 211 Even if a unique
flavor of orange was at issue, not only did the applicant not supply any evidence
as to this flavor, but flavor itself is too subjective to be perceived in a constant
way by consumers and therefore consumers could not use the flavor to
distinguish Organon's products other products.2 12
Some predict that the recognition of flavors as trademarks may be
inevitable.2 13 This may be possible when, as argued by Hobbs, something like an
orange flavored National Law Journal becomes something people might buy.214
In the advertisements for Coke Zero, the Coke Cola Company satirizes attorneys
and attempts to get fictitious legal advice that would support their clam for
trademark protection of Coke Zero. 215 Although humorous, the point of the
200. See infra app. C.
201. See infra app. A.
202. Nancy L. Clarke, Note, Issues in the Federal Registration of Flavors as Trademarks for
Pharmaceutical Products, 1993 U. ILL L. REv. 105.
203. In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
204. Id. at 1641.
205. Id at 1641.
206. Id. at 1641.
207. Id. at 1641.
208. Id at 1641.
209. In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
210. Id. at 1649-50.
211. Id. at 1650.
212. Id. at 1650.
213. Michael D. Hobbs, Jr., Orange Flavor is No Trademark, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 23, 2007, at col.
1.
214. Id.
215. For a humorous take on Coke Cola attempting to obtain trademark rights to its beverage
26 [Vol. 38:1
HeinOnline  -- 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 26 2011
NONTRADITIONAL TRADEMARKS
advertisement is obvious. Coke considers the flavor of its beverage to be an
indicator of the source of its product. Coke, to date, has not yet filed a trademark
application nor been a party to a reported case regarding the flavor of Coke Zero.
VIII. TACTILE
In the United States, there is one mark registered for the feel or texture of the
mark.2 16 There have been five applications 217 and only one reported case (where
the plaintiff did not prevail).218 The only registered mark is owned by American
Wholesale Wine and Spirits, Inc., which registered the velvet texture covering on
a bottle of wine.219 This registration issued in October of 2006.220 There were
two other tactile marks that were applied for registration for crystals applied to
tieS22 and crystals applied to art reproductions. 222  Both marks were refused
registration because the marks failed to operate as a trademark and appeared to
be merely decorations.2 23 The applicant, Karen's Krystals, Inc., did not respond
to the Office Actions and so the marks were abandoned by the PTO.224
Worldwide, there appears to be only one other trademark registered claiming the
feel of an appellation.225 In Germany, the word UNDERBERG in Braille for use
on beer and other beverages is registered.2 26
known as Coke Zero and enforcing those rights against itself, see Coke sues Coke Zero for
Infringement, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv8YgrqUCVU (Uploaded July 26, 2006).
216. See infra app. A.
217. See infra app. A.
218. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972).
219. American Wholesale Wine & Spirits, Inc., Reg. No. 3,155,702 (registered Oct. 17, 2006)
available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry=76634174. In April 2004,
Ecuador apparently granted registration for this very mark. One description of this mark is as
follows: "The mark consisted of a crackle glass texture on a bottle." Melissa E. Roth, Note,
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in
Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 457, n. 10 (2005) (quoting World's
First Texture Trademark Registered in Ecuador, 59 INTA Bulletin (Int'l Trademark Assoc., New
York, N.Y.), Dec. 15, 2004).
220. American Wholesale Wine & Spirits, Inc., Reg. No. 3,155,702 (registered Oct. 17, 2006)
available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-76634174.
221. Karen's Crystals, Inc., Serial No. 78,439,597 (applied June 22, 2004) available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-78439597
222. Karen's Crystals, Inc., Serial No. 78,402,600 (applied Apr. 15, 2004) available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-78402600.
223. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office Action, Nov. 23, 2004, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-78439597 (follow "Trademark Document
Retrieval" hyperlink for access to document) (denying registration of crystals applied to a tie);
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office Action, Jan. 28, 2005, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-78402600 (follow "Trademark Document
Retrieval" hyperlink for access to document) (denying registration of crystals applied to art
reproductions).
224. See supra notes 221-22.
225. Sieckemann, Ralf, The non-traditional Trade Mark archives - tactile mark,
http://www.copat.de/markenformen/Tactilemark.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
226. Id.
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Tactile marks remain a very odd commodity for trademark offices
worldwide. To date, only three applications have been filed worldwide for the
feel of a mark. 227 Even so, one influential commentator has noted apparently
approving of tactile marks that "[i]n terms of a brand, the feeling and textures of
a product can play on a consumer's emotions and can also relate directly to his
or her perception of quality." 22 8
IX. HOLOGRAM
As the Lanham Act and the Qualitex decision refer to "any" word, name,
symbol or device, some creative entities have even attempted to apply for
holograms as their trademark.22 9 In In re The Upper Deck Co., the Applicant
attempted to register a mark it described as follows:
The mark consists of a hologram device which is applied to the goods,
trading cards. The mark is discrete from and does not constitute a part
of the subject matter of the trading card. Neither the size nor the shape
of the hologram device, nor any content which may be represented
within the hologram device, nor the positioning of the hologram device
on the trading card are claimed as features of the mark.230
This application was denied by the TTAB on the grounds that the
holographic device failed to function as a trademark.2 3' Additionally, by
definition a holographic mark would be perceivable from multiple angles and
therefore more than one view of the mark here was applied for registration, the
TTAB found that this necessitated the finding that more than one mark was
applied for registration, something that the Lanham Act prohibits.2 32 That is, the
Applicant was attempting to register the idea of a hologram on playing cards, not
a specific, single mark.233 Based on this understanding of the interaction
between the Lanham Act and holographic marks, it is difficult to see how a
holographic mark could ever be registered.
However the PTO has registered 11 of 19 applications for trademarks that
consist of a hologram.234 Thirteen of the 19 applications have been abandoned
or cancelled for nonuse.23 5 It takes an average of almost 30 months to convince
the PTO that a hologram mark should be registered. Once again, the data does
227. .See supra Part VIII.
228. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-
Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 801
(2005).
229. In re The Upper Deck Co., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1688 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
230. Id. at 1689.
231. Id.atl691-92..
232. Id. at 1689-91.
233. Id. at 1689-91.
234. See infra app. A.
235. See infra app. C.
236. See infra app. D.
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not support the conclusion that hologram marks are a significant part of the
American trademark universe. There were no reported cases where a hologram
mark was the subject of the trademark litigation.
X. MOTION
In 1957, the PTO granted a registration for the motion of a coin spinning on
top of a hard surface to connote a particular Bank in Duluth, Minnesota.237 This
is one of the earliest registered nontraditional trademarks in America.2 38 Since
then, the PTO has granted registrations for motion marks such as preprogrammed
search lights projected into the sky for use on search lights,2 39 to promote public
awareness of the negative effects of smoking, a "stylized capital letter 'Y' within
a loosely defined circle orbited clockwise by a second, smaller, loosely defined
circle containing a stylized question mark,"2 40 and, to beat all, for use on
automobiles, the motion of a Lamborghini car door opening vertically rather than
horizontally.2 4 1
There are apparently three types of motion trademarks. The first is computer
generated moving image marks such as Nokia's Community Trademark
registration described as "The mark comprises an animation which consists of
four images depicting hands coming together, shown in succession from left to
right and from top to bottom." 24 2 The second type of motion marks consists of
the motion of the product itself as in the vertical motion of the Lamborghini
doorS24 3 or the fan-shaped spray that leave the back of a Yamaha personal
watercraft. 24 The third type of motion mark is a hand gesture.245
The complexity of claiming motion as a trademark came to a head in the
Diamond Cutter dispute with Jay-Z.246 A former TV variety professional
237. Northwestern Bank of Commerce, Reg. No. 641,872 (Registered Feb. 19, 1957) available
at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry=71691883.
238. Id.
239. Ballantyne of Omaha, Inc., Reg. No. 2,323,892, available at-http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/
tarr?regser-serial&entry=75627000.
240. Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation, Reg. No. 2,709,214, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-76427250.
241. Automobile Lamborghini Holding S.p.A., Reg. No. 2,793,439, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-75883661.
242. Nokia Corporation, Community Trademark Reg. No. 3,429,909, available at
http://oami.europa.eu/CTMOnline/RequestManager (search for Trade mark No. 3429909).
243. See supra note 26.
244. Yamaha Hatsudoki Kabushiki Kaisha, Reg. No. 1,946,170, available at
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser-serial&entry-74321288.
245. For further documentation of these and other motion marks and some extremely helpful
analysis, see Lesley Matty, Note, Rock, Paper, Scissors, Trademark? A Comparative Analysis of
Motion as a Feature of Trademarks in the United States and Europe, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 557 (2006).
246. Plaintiff Diamond Dallas Page's First Amended Complaint for (1) Trademark
Infringement; (2) False Designation of Origin; (3) Federal Dilution; (4) Unfair Competition; (5)
Injury to Business Reputation; (6) Copyright Infringement (7) Misappropriation of Trade and
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wrestler by the name of Page Falkinburg, whose wrestling name was "Diamond
Dallas" claimed to have coined and adopted as a trademark a hand gesture that
can best be described as attempting to make a diamond shape out of one's two
hands. 2 47 To make the gesture, with open hands, face your palms out. Then,
bring your forefingers and thumbs together just so they touch. If you do that,
Diamond Dallas claims you have infringed his trademark.24 8 This is the gesture
that Jay-Z made in a picture on an album cover and so Diamond Dallas filed
- 249suit.
This is a perfect example of why the TTAB's objection to holographic marks
ought to apply to motion marks as well. That is, Diamond Dallas is claiming a
trademark in the idea of a hand gesture rather than a specific mark that can be
identified.25 0 Therefore, motion marks should not be registered and should be
unenforceable.
There are actually 18 total trademark applications for motion marks and 13
subsisting registrations.25 1 It takes a mere 20 months to obtain trademark
registration status for a motion.252 There were no reported cases where a motion
mark was the subject of the litigation.
XI. THE SKY IS THE LIMIT
With the venerable explosion of interest in nontraditional trademarks,
applicants and claimants alike in the United States are interpreting "any" to
really mean "any." Therefore, if distinctive and not functional, one well-
respected commentator claims that even "sales techniques" would be appropriate
subject matter for trademark protection. Gilson claims as follows:
adoption procedures for Cabbage Patch Dolls were found to be
protectable trade dress as were the layout and overall appearance of
mail-order catalogs and a sales brochure, car service reminder letters
and the "combination and arrangement" of features in a sales report.
Advertisements for sunglasses with actors posing as vampires--and
other vampire-related marketing--were found to be protectable trade
dress, as was the overall image of Marlboro cigarette advertising. 253
Commercial Value, Diamond Dallas Page v. Shawn Carter, No. CV05-08475 DSF (JWJx), (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 6, 2006), 2006 WL 4047404.
247. Id. at para. 18.
248. See supra note 246.
249. See supra note 246.
250. Moreover, even if the hand gesture is a valid trademark, rap singers do not compete with
professional wrestlers and so confusion would be impossible to establish.
251. See infra app. A.
252. See infra app. D.
253. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-
Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 816-
17(2005).
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If you cannot use a cowboy or scary people wearing sunglasses without
violating someone else's trademark rights, I submit that we have taken what used
to be a firmly grounded right of prior appropriation to support and maintain fair
competition and moved it right past the stratosphere and right to the
mesosphere.2 54 As one reporter has put it, "What's next? A fee for looking?"25 5
XII. HARMONIZATION
There are three competing understandings of the word "harmonization." On
one hand, it could mean an effort to make all trademark law in the world uniform
so that trademark owners know the bounds of protection anywhere in the world
by understanding the laws of one country, thereby allowing trademark owners a
higher degree of confidence in the worldwide market.256 It might also be
understood to provide "an approximation of different rules in order to minimize
any conflict that their differences might generate; . . . not necessarily imply[ing
the] replication of rules."257 Or harmonization may mean an effort to create a
relationship between things that implies the creation of accord or consonance.258
One way or the other, the comments herein are equally applicable to each
and every definition of or motivation for harmonization.
A. Civil Law
The Civil Law of trademarks is oriented on the registration system and more
oriented to the benefit of the trademark owner.25 9 Trademark rights subsist upon
260 261
registration.260 With few exceptions, without registration, the trademark right
does not exist.2 62 In Japan, for example, the most common word for "trademark"
254. A further example is the registered mark of a British female face for use on educational
services. See Sally Ramage, Reg. No. 3,440,915 available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/
tarr?regser-serial&entry-79%2FO35414&action=Request+Status ("The mark consists of the color
brown appears in the woman's eyes and portions of her hair, the color red appears in portions of
her hair, the color pink appears in her lips, and the color tan appears in the woman's face and
neck.").
255. David W. Dunlap, What Next? A Fee For Looking?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,1998, at Fl.
256. Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification and Reform in
International Commercial Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 683 (1992).
257. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side
Effects ofFree Trade, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 401, 427 (1995).
258. Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM J. CoMP. L. 699, 700-02
(1991).
259. Terrance J. Keenan, American and French Perspectives on Trademark Keying: The Courts
Leave Businesses Searching for Answers, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 14 (2005)..
260. Michel J. Ayer, Why the Time Has Arrived to Broaden Protection of Foreign Trademarks
in the United States and Why it Won't Happen, 32 J. CORP. L. 927, 935 (2007).
261. These exceptions come in the form of limited rights granted to the first user of a mark that
becomes famous without registration. In such a setting, subsequent registrants must accept and
allow such prior use. See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY IN JAPAN 85-90 (2007) (discussing the effect of use in Japan).
262. Max Vern, A Trademark Visa -- Aspects of International Trademark Use and Protection,
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(shohyo) is not even used to describe an appellation of source unless it is
registered.263
The criteria for registration are very plainly spelled out. The various Civil
Law trademark statutes state the specific types of trademarks that may be
registered and those that may not be registered. 2 64 Although a WIPO survey
indicates that many Civil Law countries allow registration of nontraditional
trademarks, very few actually have registered significant numbers of
nontraditional trademarks.2 65
Since the inception of the CTM system in 1996,266 there has been some
application activity for nontraditional marks in, for example, the Community
Trademark system for the European Union. The data on CTM applications for
nontraditional trademarks post 1996 is as follows. 26 7
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 847, 848 (2006).
263. KENNETH L. PORT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN JAPAN 95
(2007).
264. See Trademark Act, Law No. 127 of 1959, arts. 3-4 (Japan), translated and available at
http://wwwjapaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id-45&vm=04&re=02 (prescribing six types
of things that can be registered and 19 types of marks that may not be registered in Japan); Article
L71 1-1 (France) available at http://l95.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code 35.pdf (providing three examples of
marks worthy of registration). The EU denied the registration of a mark that consisted of"balsamic
fruity scent with a slight hint of cinnamon" for educational services and food and drink because the
chemical formula did not satisfy the technical requirement that the mark be able to be depicted
graphically. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11737, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j6/ (search for Case C-273/00).
265. See, e.g. 1) The Braille form of UNDERBERG in Germany for use on beer,
http://www.copat.de/markenformen/Tactilemark.pdf; 2) The feel of a velvet patch on a wine bottle
in Ecuador, Melissa E. Roth, Note, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L.
REv. 457, n. 10 (2005) (quoting World's First Texture Trademark Registered in Ecuador, 59 INTA
Bulletin (Int'l Trademark Assoc., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 15, 2004.).
266. The Community trademark (CTM) system was introduced in 1996 by The Trade Marks
and Designs Registration Office ofthe European Union (OHIM). CTM covers the entire European
Union and is valid in all 27 Member States. To date there are approximately 600,000 CTM
registered trademarks. The Trade Marks and Designs Registration Office of the European Union,
Trade Marks, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/index.en.do..
267 Color marks are excluded because the database does not differentiate between color alone
marks and color as an attribute of the mark. This study regards color alone as a mark. See The
Trade Marks and Designs Registration Office of the European Union: CTM-ONLINE - Trade
Mark Consultation Service - Basic, http://oami.europa.eu/
CTMOnline/RequestManager/enSearchBasic (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (searchable database
does not allow searching for color alone as a mark).
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The two things in this graph that are striking are that the number of sound
marks issued has dropped significantly and that the number of sound marks
applied for has risen sharply. This inverse relationship between 
the number of
applicatiorns fbr sound marks and the number that are actually 
registered is
indicitive of the lack of experience Civil Law countries have with exarmmnig
nontraditional trademarks.
To allow the registration of nontraditional trademarks (or any trademark
whatsoever), the Civil Law requires a specific statute stating the specific type of
mark to be registered. This is because one can say that Civil Law systems, in
general, are far more positivist in orientation than the Common 
Law system of
the United States.1 In Civil Law systems, judges do not make law, they
268 Errol E. Meidinger, learning Sustainability, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 253 (2003); 
Alan
Uzelac, Comparative Theme.: UNCITRAL Notes on Arbitral Proceedings: A Regional View, 
4
CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 135, 153 (1997); Karen Engle Comparative Law as Exposmng the Foreign
System s Internal Critique: An Introduction, 1997 UTAH L. REy. 359, 362 (1997) 
(quoting Marie-
Claire Belleau, The " luristes Inquiets'": Legal Classicism and Criticism 
in Early Twentieth-
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interpret and apply it.269 Although that is an overly broad generalization that is
used as a litmus test in confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees 27 0
before the United States Senate, it is more accurate in Civil Law jurisdictions
than in the United States.
Trademark statutes in Civil Law jurisdictions are written with precision so
that interpretation is not necessary.27 1 If a statute needs to be interpreted, it is
synonymous with saying that that statute needs to be revised or amended.272
Civil Law systems do not recognized the notion of stare decisis.273 As
judges are only supposed be applying the statute in a more mechanical manner,
there is no need for judges to look for guidance outside of the statute itself.
Most Civil Law systems would not allow a trial by jury for a trademark
violation. Rather, the initial trial would be before a panel of three judges. In
many Civil Law systems, judges are rotated frequently. 274 It is common during a
long trial to have different judges rotate in and out of the panel. 2 75 As judging is
a more mechanical endeavor where judges are simply applying the statue as
written to any given set of facts, it should not matter who, personally, might be
on trial panel.
Discovery in Civil Law systems is quite limited.276 As pleading is fact-
based,277 plaintiffs are not allowed to go on fishing expeditions during
discovery.278 Litigants must produce any document specifically named, but, for
Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 379 (1997)). See also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 16-17 (3d ed. 2007) (comparing common
and civil law perspectives on interpreting the law).
269. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil - A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP.
L. 311, 318 n.9 (2003); Rett R. Ludwikoski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United
State Presidentialism in the Civil Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 29, 45-46 (2003);
MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 88-89.
270. See, e.g, Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice Before S.
Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (Ruth Bader Ginsburg
stated that judges do not make law, they interpret and apply the law).
271. MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 61 (law is a precise science and should
be able of clear communication. "The law is thus enriched, and enriched by a purely scientific
method") (quoting RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 30 (James Crawford Ledlie, trans., Erwin Grueber ed., 3d ed. 1907)).
272. MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 39-47.
273. MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 45-47.
274. J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J.
JAPANESE STUD. Ill, 116 n.16 (1988).
275. Id. (stating that judges are rotated "frequently.")
276. See Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison ofJapanese and U.S.
Methods of Evidence Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 AsIAN-PACiFIc L. & PoL'Y J. 1 (2002); Kuo-
CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003) (comparing discovery in the
United State to civil law jurisdictions).
277. See Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083, 1088-89 (1975) (discussing role of the judge in gathering facts); Benjamin Kaplan et
al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1234-35 (1958) ("proof-taking is
conducted mainly by the court" in Germany).
278. See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L.
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example, defendants are never asked open-ended interrogatories 2 79 or requests
for documents 280 for which one would need a truck to deliver the responses.2 8 1
The appeal process in Civil Law countries is a continuation of the original
trial.282 Once the trial court comes to a conclusion, the appellate court retries the
case. 2 83 One can produce new evidence, give different responses, change the
theory of the case, etc.284 Litigants are not bound to the trial record of things
said.2 85 Therefore, there is no concept of standard of review when a Civil Law
appellate court considers a trial court outcome.2 86 In fact, because judges rotate,
in a lengthy trial, it is not uncommon for a trial court judge to be reassigned to
the appellate bench while the appeal is pending.28 7 Such a Civil Law judge
would not recuse him or herself.288 Rather, this judge would join the appellate
bench for an appeal of a trial that judge tried.
In Civil Law countries, trademark related surveys are either non-existent or
not relied on anywhere near as much as in the United States. 289 As such, a Civil
Law judge may only hear about how the public views the mark, whether they
would be confused by a competing use, or how strong the mark is from the
litigants themselves.290 Surveys are considered far too unreliable to be used in a
REV. 299 (2002); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say "No Fishing": The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006) (criticizing describing discovery as a "fishing expedition.").
279. See KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 207-08 (2003)
(restriction on interrogatories intended to prevent overly broad "fishing expeditions").
280. See also Brendan Sweeney, The Role of Damages in Regulating Horizontal Price-Fixing:
Comparing the Situation in the United States, Europe and Australia, 30 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 837
(2006) (the job of collecting documents is a judicial function).
281. See, e.g., Class Action (InterScope Communications 1991) (A film starring Gene Hackman
where the defense attempts to bury the plaintiff in a mountain of discovery to try to win the case).
282. Douglas C. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis
and Proposals for Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 460-61 (1997).
283. Id. at 460-61.
284. Id. at 460-61..
285. Id. at 461.
286. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
855-58 (1985) (stating that there is "[n]o presumption of correctness attaches to the initial
judgment" in German appellate courts.)
287. See Ramseyer, supra note 274, at 116 n. 16 (stating that Japanese judges rotate
"frequently").
288. But see Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from An
American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 58, 64 n. 34 (1994) (quoting Article 731-1 of the French
Code of Judicial Organization which requires a judge to recuse oneself if one previously heard the
case.); Chuichi Suzuki, Problems of Disqualification of Judges in Japan, 18 Am. J. COMP. L. 727,
729 (1970) (Japanese judges disqualified if participated in trial).
289. Yuriko Inoue, Kondo no osore no rissho to anketochosa [Proof of Likelihood of Confusion
and Surveys], in Chitekizaisan no Choryu [Current Trends in Intellectual Property] (Institute of
Intellectual Property ed., 1995).
290. See, e.g., Sony KK v. Yugn Kaisha Walkman, 1598 Hanrei Jiho 142 (Chiba Dist. Ct.,
April 4, 1996)(relying on a survey proffered by Sony to find confusion between Walkman cassette
players and shoes), translated in Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual Property Law in
Translation: Representative Cases and Commentary, 34 VANDERBILT J. TRANS. L. 847, 856-867
(2001).
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court of law.291 On the other hand, individual judges make up their own mind
regarding these questions.29 2 Therefore, it is not unusual in Civil Law
jurisdictions for judges to reach decisions that are clearly not responsive to
general public perception.293 Considering there are no juries, this means that the
only way for a judge to answer whether the mark is strong, for example, is to
look at the evidence him or herself and reach a conclusion.294
The reason it is more appropriate to treat trademarks in such a positivist
manner is because Civil Law jurisdictions consider the trademark itself as
property.29 5 When one owns a registration one owns a trademark. There is no
distinction conceptually made between the trademark and the trademark right.
All rights in trademarks are determined by the scope of the classification of
goods or services claimed in the registration itself.2 9 6 It would be appropriate to
say that a trademark owner owns the right to use the mark on all goods in the
classification for which it is registered.
That is, trademarks in Civil Law jurisdictions are corporeal things. Civil
Law judges do not make tortured analogies to "quasi property rights" as they do
in the United States. 297 Trademarks are property, period.
The theory that trademarks are property is doctrinally evidenced by the fact
that trademark rights in Civil Law jurisdictions are severable. 298 A trademark
291. Yuriko Inoue, Kondo no osore no rissho to ankeitochosa [Proof of Likelihood of
Confusion and Surveys], in Chitekizaisan no Choryu [Current Trends in Intellectual Property]
(Institute of Intellectual Property ed., 1995).
292. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 117-18 (explaining that civil
judges both gather and weigh evidence).
293. Cf Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Fernandes, KK, 1719 Hanrei Jiho 122 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb.
24, 2000) ("Les Paul" guitar shape is generic), translated in Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual
Property Law in Translation: Representative Cases and Commentary, 34 VANDERBLT J. TRANs. L.
847, 856-867 (2001) with Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539 (6th
Cir. 2005) (consumers likely to experience initial confusion due to identifying shape but not point-
of-sale confusion).
294. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 268, at 117-18 (explaining that civil
judges both gather and weigh evidence).
295. For Japan, see Makoto Amino, Shohyo (Trademarks) 47 (1992); for France, see Article
L713-1 available at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_35.pdf("Registration of a mark shall confer
on its owner a right of property. . .").
296. For France, see L. 713-1 available at http://195.83.177.9/uplI/pdf/code 35.pdf
("Registration of a mark shall confer on its owner a right of property in that mark for the goods and
services he has designated.").
297. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 50 F. Supp. 891, 900 (D.
Maryland 1943) ("in the modem law of business colorable imitation of a trade-mark is prejudicial
to the quasi-property interest in the trade-mark itself especially where it has been much
advertised."); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Dilution law,
unlike traditional trademark infringement law . . . is not based on a likelihood of confusion
standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a holder has in maintaining the
integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.") (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d
616 628 (6th Cir. 2003)); Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)
(a trademark owner has at best a "quasi-property right" in its mark); Frank Schechter, The Rational
Process of Trade-Mark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 831-32 (1927) (comparing treatment of
a mark in different jurisdictions).
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owner in a Civil Law country can sell the same mark to one entity to make
bicycles and another entity to make cameras. The quality control of a licensee's
299trademark use need not be supervised by the licensor in Civil Law countries.
There is no tracking of the goodwill. Trademarks can be assigned in gross and
used under naked licenses.3 00 Doctrinally, trademarks act like property in Civil
Law countries.
Therefore, as property, trademarks in Civil Law countries are far harder to
obtain and far more difficult of which to be divested. Although the trademark
registration process itself in Civil Law jurisdictions is no more arduous than in
the United States and usually much easier, 01 the very fact is that one must obtain
a trademark registration before one "owns a trademark."
As such, there are very high transaction costs involved in Civil Law
countries that are not recognized in the United States. There is a very high cost
of knowledge. A user of a trademark has to, somehow, know or learn that a
registration must be filed. The cost of this knowledge is not measurable.
Additionally, an entity that wishes to own a trademark has to hire a lawyer (or
other specialist) to file the trademark application. It would be a very unlikely
occurrence for a private individual to file a trademark application pro se in Civil
Law countries.
Once registered, no Civil Law trademark office has the authority to cancel
302trademarks on their own motion for something like nonuse. It takes a specific
motion by a party who now wants to use and register the mark to obtain a
cancellation for nonuse.o3 That is, in order to obtain a registration and in order
to maintain the trademark, use need never occur. Usually, three years of nonuse
opens the door for aggrieved parties to file a motion to cancel a trademark for
nonuse.304 The evidentiary burden is similarly high for other common reasons to
298. For Japan, see Japanese Trademark Act, art. 24(1) available at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=45&vm=02&re=02&new-1 ("trademark
right may be divided for each of the designated goods"); for France, see Law No. 92--597 of July 1,
1992, on the Intellectual Property Code (Legislative Part) as last amended by Law No. 94-102 of
February 5, 1994, book 7, title 1, chapter 4, L. 714-1 available at http://195.83.177.9/
upl/pdf/code35.pdf ("The rights under a mark may be transferred in whole or in part,
independently of the company that exploits them or
has them exploited.").
299. For Japan, see Kazuko Matsuo, Trademarks, in 4 Doing Business in Japan Sec. 6.01 - Sec.
6.12 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2007) (entire chapter of treatise on licensing intellectual property in
Japan and never mentions quality control).
300. See Kazuko Matsuo, Intellectual Property Protection, Doing Business in Japan § 6.01 [d]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2009) ("The prior rule that assignment of a trademark independent of the
business good will concerned was not permitted was abolished, permitting freer transfer of
registered trademarks."); Makoto Amino, Shohyo [Trademarks] 647-54 (1995).
301. See Kazuko Matsuo, 3-6 Doing Business in Japan § 6.03 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2009)
(discussing process).
302. See Kazuko Matsuo, 3-6 Doing Business in Japan § 6.03[8] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2009)
(must request cancellation).
303. Id.
304. Japanese Trademark Law, art. 50-1, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/
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petition a trademark to cancel a trademark registration such as nondistinctiveness
or functionality.
Because the trademark in Civil Law countries is property, it is harder to lose,
harder to obtain and more easily confused. That is, in Civil Law countries,
trademarks are construed much more broadly than in the United States.
The Civil Law of trademarks find their origin in providing businesses an
ability to protect their "signs" as corporeal rights. 305 The origin of the Common
Law trademark is to prevent a consumer from being confused.306
The Civil Law of trademark jurisprudence focuses on the functions of
trademarks. When a function of the trademark is harmed, the Civil Law world
calls that trademark infringement.
The first function of trademarks is the source indicating function. 308 This is
the only role that trademarks play in the United States. 30 9 This function allows
the trademark claimant to use the mark to indicate that it is the sole creator of the
good or service to which the mark is attached.
The second function is the quality guarantee function. 3 10 By using the same
trademark on the same goods or services, customers can rely on the fact that the
quality of the goods or services will be consistent. Not that the quality will be
law/detail/?id=45&vm-02&re=02&new-1
305. See Terrance J. Keenan, American and French Perspectives on Trademark Keying: The
Courts Leave Businesses Searching for Answers, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 14, P24-P25
(2005) (French "trademark rights are akin to property rights"); Rudolf Rayle, The Trend Towards
Enhancing Trademark Owners' Rights-A Comparative Study of U.S. and German Trademark
Law, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 270 (2000) ("[tjrademarks in Germany are property").
306. See Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of Trademark Law: The
Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transnational Trademark Protection, 149 U.PA.
L.REv. 309, 309 (2000) (stating that traditionally, trademarks were "understood to indicate the
origin of a product.").
307. KENNETH L. PORT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION IN JAPAN 6 (2007).
308. Shoen Ono, Overview of Japanese Trademark Law, Chapter 5, p. 7-8 (1992) translated
and available at http://www.iip.or.jp/e/epublication/ono/index.html (chapters are not
consecutively numbered); Makoto Amino, Shohyo (Trademarks) 71-2; Ethan Horwitz, FRA-3
World Trademark Law and Practice, France § 3.01 (Mathew Bender, Rev. ed.) (In French law, "the
sole condition [of trademark validity] is that it must be distinctive with respect to the articles it
identifies," citing Mathely, Letter from France, (1969)).
309. See Radiance A. Walters, Partial Forfeiture: The Best Compromise in Trademark
Licensing Protocol, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 126, 128 (2009) ("According to the
statute, the purpose of a trademark is to identify a good or service to the consuming public and
ensure consistency in quality.").
310. Shoen Ono, Overview of Japanese Trademark Law, Chapter (1999) translated and
available at http://www.iip.orjp/e/e publication/ono/index.html (chapters are not consecutively
numbered); Makoto Amino, Shohyo (Trademarks) 73-74; 2-3 Ethan Horwitz, World Trademark
Law and Practice § 3.01 (Mathew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (Under German law, trademarks "must be
likely to serve the consumer as a means of recognizing the goods of the applicant and to distinguish
those goods from the goods of competitors. A mark cannot be registered if it is not capable of
distinguishing the goods upon which it appears, if it consists solely of figures or letters, or if it
consists of words which indicate the kind, time and place of production, the nature, purpose, price,
quantity or weight of the goods.") (citations omitted).
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good or bad, just consistent. Therefore, a handbag purchased at JC Penny will
have different quality expectation than one purchased at Coach.
311The third function is the consistent good function. When a specific
trademark is used, the consumer can immediately recognize that a specific good
or range of goods is associated with the use of this mark. Therefore, when a
consumer sees the trademark Kodak, the consumer knows that the range of
goods associated with that mark will somehow include something to do with
cameras. In the United States, when the producer creates a close association
between the good and the trademark, the mark will be rendered generic.3 2 In
Civil Law countries, this ability to broadly protect the good's function renders
the dilution doctrine unattractive.
Finally, the advertising function of trademarks is of growing import.3 13 The
use of trademarks plays a very important role in advertising a good or service.
Take Coach purses, for example. Just saying the word "Coach" connotes
expensive and luxurious purses and handbags for women. Coach need not say
311. Shoen Ono, Shohyoho (Trademark Law) 49 (1994); Makoto Amino, Shohyo (Trademarks)
774-75. A Danish decision from 1983 held that confusingly similar names could were both eligible
for registration as trademarks because the two companies were in totally different fields, thus there
would be no confusion of one product line with another. 2-3 Ethan Horwitz, World Trademark Law
and Practice, Denmark § 3.07, n. 16 (Mathew Bender, Rev. Ed.) ("A trade mark can only stop the
registration of a company name if the company actually is doing business with identical or similar
goods or services for which the trade mark is registered but a trade mark registration can only stop
a person using the trade mark as a name if the trade mark has been put on the official list of names.
The rights to names and trade marks are obviously not reciprocal, but the rights derived from
names are on the other hand more narrow in scope, as identity or near-identity until now has been
paramount to the ability to stop infringing use or abuse of a name or a trade mark.
In this connection, it seems that a trade mark registration combined with the provisions under the
law protecting names would form the best possible protection in Denmark for trade marks derived
from eg a company name, a founder's name etc. It should be considered desirable to register
secondary names for registered companies or to put the registered trade mark on the official list of
names as identical trade marks are then prevented from being used even for different goods or
services.") (quoting Memorex A/S v. Memotak, ApS, decision of the Supreme Court dated
February 15, 1983, UfR 1983, 341, [1983] EIPR D-247.).
312. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963) (the product named "thermos" became the word used to describe a vacuum-insulated
container that would keep beverages hot or cold and thus was generic).
313. See Shoen Ono, Shohyoho (Trademark Law) 49 (1994); Makoto Amino, Shohyo
(Trademarks) 74-75. Argentina has struggled repeatedly with the importance of advertising in
trademark law. Aracama Zorraquin describes the evolution of the law this way: "Those who are
familiar with the evolution of Argentine case law concerning the protection of advertising phrases
(slogans) will remember that for a time such phrases were accepted as being registrable under
trademark law. A subsequent development brought about the prohibition of their registration as
such, whereupon case law, after reverting to the original position, progressed towards a situation
where phrases of advertising character had to be protected by Law No. 11, 723 on Copyright,
whereas those that possessed distinctive character were to be protected by the Law on Trademarks.
This distinction, which is highly subjective and very difficult to make in practice, has been
removed by the new Law, which allows registration as trademarks of phrases for advertising
purposes that meet the requirements of registrability specified by the Law on Trademarks." 1-3
Ethan Horwitz, World Trademark Law and Practice, Argentina § 3.01, n. 11 (Mathew Bender, Rev.
Ed.) (citing Ernesto Aracama Zorraquin, New Legislation in Argentina, 1982 Ind. Prop. 88, 93).
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anything about their product. Just saying the word is enough. Even lesser
known, less expensive brands of purses utilize the advertising function of
trademarks. As producers attempt to raise brand awareness and make sales, they
focus on the use of their trademark to operate as a short cut to their reputation,
whether they are a high-end producer or not.
Civil Law countries protect these functions of trademarks. Harming any one
of these functions results in a claim of trademark infringement. That is, the
trademark right in Civil Law countries is far broader than in the United States.
The protection of nontraditional trademarks in a Civil Law system is
problematic because of the need to be able to depict marks graphically. In the
United States, a verbal description of a scent mark, for example, sufficed;3 14
however, in the CTM and before German judges, a chemical formula of a scent
was deemed insufficient.315 Under TRIPS, "members may require, as a condition
of registration, that signs be visually perceptible." 1 Civil Law systems and the
CTM take this rather literally.
However, the graphic representation requirement is satisfied by a "stave
divided into measures and showing, in particular, a clef, musical notes and rests
whose form indicates the relative value and, where necessary accidentals." 3 17
Color may satisfy the graphic representation requirement if an "internationally
recognized identification code" is used.
B. Common Law (United States) 319
Essentially, each element of the mini-primer on the Civil Law of trademarks
from above is answered in the diametric opposite when in the United States. All
314. In re Celia Clarke, dba Clarke's OSEWEZ, Serial No. 758,429, Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 53; 17 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1238, September 19, 1990.
315. Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent-Und Markenamt, Eurpean Court of Justice, Case C-
273/00, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11737. See also, Eli Lilly & Co.'s Application, Second Board of Appeal,
Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (2004) E.T.M.R. 4 (refusing the registration of the
taste of strawberries as used on pharmaceuticals) available at http://oami.europa.eu/
search/legaldocs/la/ENRefused-index.cfin (search for Trade mark No. 001452853).
316. TRIPs Agreement, Art. 15(1) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/27-
trips.pdf.
317. Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Kist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14313, OJ C 21, 24.01.2004, p. 4
(2003), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search for Case no C-283/01).
318. C-104/01, Libertell Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. 13793, OJ C 146,
21.06.2003, p. 6 (2003) available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search for Case no C-
104/01).
319. As the United States is the last true believer of the common law jurisdictions and the
largest economy in the world, it makes a perfect contrast to Civil Law countries. Most other
common law countries such a Great Britain or Canada have already moved their trademark systems
closer to Civil Law countries. Australia may be an exception to this. In Australia, although
nontraditional trademarks like color are registered and enforced, they remain a "relatively rare
beast." Campbell Thompson & Bill Ladas, How Green Is My Trade Mark? Woolworths v. BP, 29
EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 29, 29 (2007).
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rights in the United States are derived from priority of use, not registration. 32 0 It
is this use that makes the federal regulation of trademarks constitutional in the
United States.321 Trademarks are not writings.3 22 Therefore, the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution does not apply. Trademarks
323
may by regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.32 For there to be
commerce which Congress can regulate, there must be use in interstate
commerce. Although there are advantages to obtaining a federal registration in
the United States,324 the trademark right itself subsists upon use of a mark, not on
registration.32 5
320. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-100 (1918).
321. Jerome Gilson, Karin Green, & Anne Gilson LaLonde, 1-3 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.02
(Matthew Bender); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Proctor and Gamble Company v. Johnson and Johnson,
Inc. 485 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) aff'd at 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Compagnie
Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d 841, 854 (CAFC 1993) ("The 'use in commerce' requirement is the
Constitutional basis for enactment of the Lanham Act, .. .) (Judge Nies, dissenting); Buti v. Perosa,
S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826, 119 S. Ct. 73, 142 L. Ed. 2d 57
(1998)("use in commerce" requirement of the Lanham Act is simply a jurisdictional predicate to
any law passed by Congress under the Commerce Clause. The "history and text of the Lanham Act
show that 'use in commerce' reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause") (quoting United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand,
America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997)).
322. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (discussing difference in a writing and
a trademark).
323. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
324. 1) Notice: Perhaps one of the most significant reasons to register a trademark regards
notice of rights. Section 22 (15 U.S.C. §1072) provides for constructive notice of claimed rights
under the Lanham Act. That is, once a trademark is registered, all would-be infringers are charged
with knowledge of the registration and the benefits derived thereunder. In litigation, this could have
a significant impact on the outcome of any given case. See Melissa E. Roth, Something Old,
Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition In Nontraditional
Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 457, 469-471 (2005) (registration provides
constructive notice). 2) Deterrence: Closely related to the notice function, trademark registration
owners can claim use of the @ symbol on goods or services. Although not precisely documented as
such, it is thought that use of the @ symbol provides some deterrence to infringers. See Philip J.
Greene, Trademark Counsel in the Federal Government -- A Practitioner's Perspective, 86 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 361, 375 (2004) ("the (R) symbol adjacent to the mark will help dispel
the notion that government marks are in the public domain"). 3) National protection: Once a
trademark is registered, the owner of that registration can claim national priority. If this registration
is based on an intent to use a mark, that priority date reverts back to the actual application date of
the registration. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 777
("Although federal registration grants substantive and procedural rights to the trademark owner, the
absence of such federal registration does not place the mark in the public domain."). 4)
Incontestability: Once a registered trademark is used for five consecutive years, the owner of that
registration can claim the registration has become "incontestable" under Section 15 of the Lanham
Act. As will be seen, this, too, can provide many positive consequences for the plaintiff/trademark
registration owner. The stakes over incontestability went up remarkably in 2009 when the Eighth
Circuit held that when a mark became incontestable, it so changed the circumstances that collateral
estoppel did not prevent the plaintiff from suing the defendant a second time on the same operative
facts. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 2009). 5) Cybersquatting:
It is far easier to establish a bona fide commercial interest in a registered trademark for purposes of
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As we adequately demonstrated in the Qualitex decision, it does not need an
act of Congress to expand the notion of trademark protection to nontraditional
trademarks.326 In that case, the Supreme Court held that "any" appellation of
source could be claimed as a trademark as long as there was secondary meaning
and that there ought to be no per se exclusion of any trademark subject matter.327
Therefore, as was stated earlier, after the Qualitex case, trademark applications
for nontraditional trademarks in the United States exploded.32 8 Congress did not
amend the Lanham Act. There was one judicial holding by the Supreme Court
and the entire scenario for nontraditional trademarks changed.329
In the United States there may be a litmus test used to attempt to exclude
activist judges where judges must swear to the "application of law" god and
forgo the "judges making law" devil,3 30 but there is plenty of evidence that
United States judges have no choice but to make law.3 3 1 As in the Qualitex case,
both the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (governing the transfer of domain names) and the
Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (governing the same but in an Article Ill-style court
of law). Bringing a cause of action under either of these provisions based on a registered trademark
substantially minimizes the burden of proving the complainant or plaintiff had a commercial
interest in the mark. Furthermore, if a trademark is registered, it makes it exceedingly difficult
(especially under the UDRP) to make the requisite showing that subsequently registering that
trademark as a domain name was done in bad faith. See Adam Silberlight, www.How to Be A
Master of Your Domain.com: A Look at The Assignment ofInternet Domain Names Under Federal
Trademark Laws, Federal Case Law, And Beyond, 10 ALB. L.J. Sa. & TECH. 229 (2000)
(discussing the application of trademark laws to cybersquatting claims). 6) Evidentiary advantages:
Section 33(b) (15 U.S.C. §1115(b)) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "To the extent that the
right to use the registered mark has become incontestable . . . the registration shall be conclusive
evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce . . ." (Emphasis added.) That is, incontestable status provides the owner with
"conclusive evidence" of the validity of the mark and other advantages. This, too, in a close call in
a litigation setting has the potential of dictating outcomes. 7) There are many other advantages to
registration, including barring infringing goods by evoking part of Customs law to certain
advantages regarding counterfeiting. Although significant in their own right, neither of these topics
plays a significant role in these materials.
325. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
326. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
329. See supra pp. 9-22 and accompanying text.
330. Confirmation Hearing, supra n. 270.
331. William E. Forbath, The Shaping of The American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1111 (1989); Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 597 (2006)
("Examples of judge-made law in [copyright law] include: 'a right to disclose or first publish a
work; a right of modification or withdrawal of a work (normally subject to an obligation to
indemnify aggrieved parties in respect of financial losses); a right to prevent excessive criticism of
a work; and a right against false attribution.") (quoting Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the
Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 229, 230
(1995)); Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (pt. 2), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 539, 557 (1982) ("The fact that PTO rules must be
consistent with judge-made law as well as statutory law limits considerably the Commissioner's
power to promulgate substantive rules, because a massive amount of judge-made law exists in the
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the Supreme Court may not have made a law allowing for nontraditional
trademarks; however, if only 54 nontraditional trademarks were filed in nearly
50 years before the Qualitex decision and 352 were filed in the 15 years after
that case, it is hard to argue that the result of the Qualitex case was anything
other than making law. Applying the old statute in a new way made law. That is
all that happened in the Qualitex case.
Of course, in the United States, there is general pleading for lawsuits, 332
discovery is liberal333 and there are jury trials. Today, roughly one half of all
trademark trials are before juries.334 In addition, surveys are greatly used and
relied upon.3 In some district courts, if a litigant does not proffer a survey it is
presumed that the survey would not support the proposition that is being
argued. 3 Surveys in the United States have become a more precise science.
These are not general opinion surveys, which are not worth much. Good
trademark surveys establish foundation, establish that the respondent is
knowledgeable about the questions asked and can be submitted into evidence as
reliable.337
The trademark in the United States is never owned.3 In the United States,
only the right to exclude others to the extent the mark is used and as long as the
mark is used would be considered a property right. A property right of exclusion
patent and trademark field.").
332. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
333. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
334. Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims
Established/Not Established (2008), http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-property/files/WM-
TMStudy-GraphB.pdf.
335. See generally, Phyllis J. Welter, TRADEMARK SURVEYS (1998).
336. World Wrestling Fed'n. Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (WD
Penn. 2003) ("The Court is aware that WWE is not legally required to conduct a confusion survey.
Such a failure, particularly when the trademark owner is financially able, justifies an inference 'that
the plaintiff believes the results of the survey will be unfavorable."') (quoting Charles Jacquin et
Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 475 (3d Cir. 1990)).
337. Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual Confusion
Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1416 (2009); E.
Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99 TRADEMARK
REP. 1118 (2009); Richard J. Leighton, Using Daubert-Kumho Gatekeeping to Admit and Exclude
Surveys in Lanham Act Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92 TRADEMARK REP.743, 781 (2002)
(discussing reliability of surveys); Alex Simonson, Surveys of Trademark Confusion: Basic
Differences, 5 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (1998) (discussing ways to critique surveys); William
G. Barber, How to Do a Trademark Dilution Survey (or Perhaps How Not to Do One), 89
TRADEMARK REP. 616 (1999); Gabriel M. Gelb and Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark
Litigation: Ready or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073 (2007); Dan Sarel &
Howard Marmorstein, Designing Confusion Surveys for Cyberspace Trademark Litigation: The
Admissibility vs. Weight Debate, Vol. 14 No. 9 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY LAW
JOURNAL 12 (2002); Keith M. Stolte, Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies:
Monetary Relief Should Not Require Proof of Actual Confusion, 75 DENv. U.L. REv. 229, 249-50
(1997); Jacob Jacoby, A Critique of Rappeports "Litigation Surveys-Social 'Science' as
Evidence ", 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1480 (2002); Vincent N. Palladino, Assessing Trademark
Significance: Genericness, Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 857 (2002).
338. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 96-98 (1918).
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and a property right to a corporeal thing are very different things. In the United
States the trademark right is a right of exclusion; in Civil Law nations a
trademark is a corporeal thing that is owned.
The United States system of trademark protection is based on fair
competition. 33 9 Trademark law is one subset of unfair competition law. It has its
roots in the English tort of deceit where the deceived consumer had standing to
sue, not an aggrieved trademark holder.34 0 The trademark laws in the United
States are founded on the notion that the consumer has a right to be free of
deception.34 1
In the United States today, there are three competing interests that need to be
simultaneously balanced. The first is this consumer's right to be free of
deception.342 However, if the system over-protects the consumer, trademark
holders may use trademarks less and thereby society would not receive that
benefit of trademark use. Consumers' search costs would go up if trademark
holders used trademarks less often and consumers would pay more for their
343goods and services.
Therefore, the rights of trademark holders also must be balanced in this
equation. Trademark holders must receive adequate incentive to continue to use
trademarks. 344 Trademark holders need to feel that their trademarks are
appropriately protected and enforced. Trademark holders need to continue to
invest in trademarks so that society's search costs are lessened and society can
take advantage of the short-cut function that trademarks play.34 5
As a subset of unfair competition law, trademark law and policy also must
include the rights of third parties and their ability to compete.346 If trademark
rights are too strong in the United States, third parties will not be able to
compete. Third parties' costs of market access would go up if they have to
defend too many law suits or if they have to work too hard to clear trademarks
before using the marks.347 Additionally, third parties would suffer from too
339. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
340. J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 5:2 (1996 4th
ed.).
341. Id.
342. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Real Color Pages, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 775,
780-81 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
343. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1986).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 831 (2000) ("The economic rationale for
trademark protection is undermined [by expansion of rights] because the expansion actually
increases total transaction costs rather than being, at least, cost neutral . . . . [T]he expansion
undercuts the legal rationale for trademark protection because it tips the scales in favor of
protecting the goodwill of the trademark owner rather than balancing the interests of the consumer
to be free from confusion and third parties' right to compete.").
347. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
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strong protection of trademarks because the range of available marks that third
parties might use would shrink.
All three of these interests need to be balanced. Historically, the United
States has been focused on the equality of each of these three pillars of
trademark protection. The data on reported trademark cases seems to bear out
this fact. In the last 60 years, trademark claimants have prevailed in their claims
of infringement 50% of the time.348 This rate is shrinking. Today, fewer
trademark claimants prevail in their claims of infringement than they did just a
decade ago.349
Therefore, there is a critical gap in the theoretical justification of protecting
trademarks in Civil Law countries compared to the United States. This
theoretical difference makes harmonization of any sort difficult. Even if the
doctrine is harmonized, the underlying theory will remain diverse. This
distinction is why trademark harmonization has not been successful to date. In
order to succeed, the doctrine and the theory must be harmonized.
XIII. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST NONTRADITIONAL MARKS
Normatively, with few exceptions, nontraditional trademarks do not satisfy
the expectations we have for trademarks. Even doctrinally, there is little
justification for the protection of nontraditional trademarks. Nontraditional
trademarks are functional. Nontraditional trademarks do not act as indicators of
source. Nontraditional trademarks are byzantine elements of a good or service.
They do not indicate that the good or service comes from a consistent source.
Even though nontraditional trademarks have recognized a huge spike post-
Qualitex, nontraditional trademarks are very rarely found valid and infringed by
Article III style court.
Jacobson, the losing party in Qualitex v. Jacobson, actually provided the
most the perfect objections to all of nontraditional trademarks, not just color.5
These are addressed below.
A. Sense Depletion
Jacobson argued that to protect a color would ultimately limit the number of
colors available for a competitor to use.35 1 When applying this notion to
nontraditional marks, we might call it sense depletion.
REv. 585 (2008).
348. Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims
Established/Not Established (2008), http://www.wmitchell.edulintellectual-property/files/WM-
TMStudy-GraphB.pdf.
349. See Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, Graph C: Infringement Claims
Established/Not Established by Decade (2008) http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-
property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphC.pdf (graphically representing claims established by decade).
350. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
351. Id. at 168.
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When the human brain can only remember sixteen scents for a long period of
time, 352 allowing anyone to register a smell seems to work great hardship, a great
depletion, of that sense. Although there are many sounds available in the world,
allowing anyone to exclude others from the use of sound would inappropriately
drive up transaction costs without the related benefit to society of the trademark
use.3 13 That is, making a product sound attractive is decoration. Decoration is
considered to be aesthetically functional 354 and therefore not protected.
It seems that the sense depletion theory is very important in field of
nontraditional trademarks. Allowing them to be protected depletes the field and
does not result in the expected reduction in transaction costs.
B. Sense Confusion
With sense confusion, we are worried about articulating a standard by which
a use could be judged as infringing or not infringing. All Circuits have come up
with tests to be applied to traditional marks.355 This is known as the likelihood
of confusion analysis.3 s6
With nontraditional marks, what will be the test? Simple variations of the
nontraditional trademark might result in big differences in perception because
nontraditional trademarks rely on senses that are arbitrary and not well
understood. These senses are not consistent between people. They, in fact, are
inherently unreliable.357
With a traditional mark, it can be projected to a jury. The jury can look at
the alleged infringing mark, such as KOKE and compare it to the word COKE.
The jury can think about whether KOKE infringes COKE. It does not have to
agree with what COKE is, how it should be perceived, or how it is to be known.
Those are givens in traditional trademarks.
With nontraditional marks, the jury has to first decide what the mark is
before it can go on to decide if the mark has been infringed. When
nontraditional trademarks are invoked, reasonable jurors would think differently
of the nontraditional trademark. No two jurors would ever agree on the scent of
a mark or the motion of a mark. These things are subjective and variable. When
352. See Churovich, supra n. 187, at 302.
353. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1986) (discussing costs and benefits of trademarks generally).
354. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1985) (commercial need
precludes trademark protection); see also Jerre B. Swann, The Design of Restaurant Interiors - A
New Approach to Aesthetic Functionality, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 408, 408 (1986) ("Primarily
attractive features serve 'other than a trade-mark purpose."'); 1-2 GILsON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.11
("...consumers may not perceive certain nontraditional marks as trademarks at all. They may see
them as merely decorative, as an inherent part of the product or as an attempt to amuse, rather than
as indicating the source of the goods").
355. 5-5 GILsON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.02.
356. 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.04.
357. See, e.g., supra Parts VI-VII.
358. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
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a scent mark is not perceived the same between two people or even by one
person given weather patterns, etc. these marks seem too indeterminate to
warrant trademark protection. There would be far too much sense confusion to
make sense of these trademarks.
C. Ability to Act as a Trademark
The biggest worry with nontraditional trademarks is whether they are
actually acting as a trademark at all. Consider, for example, the Yamaha
personal watercraft spray. Is this so-called trademark acting to identify Yamaha
personal watercrafts or is it a nifty product feature that people buy because of the
product feature, not because they are relying on it to identify source. Yet again,
we bump into the notion of aesthetic functionality.
With many nontraditional marks, one does not have to enter the murky lands
of aesthetic functionality to oppose a trademark. Most nontraditional trademarks
do not pass the functionality test. 35 9 Most nontraditional marks are initially
refused registration because of this doctrine. Nontraditional trademarks play a
role in dictating the function of a product. Many of these relate to human senses
that we do not clearly understand. One court denied trademark protection for the
color of boat engines.3 60 That court held that black motors worked to make an
object look smaller and therefore was playing a function of the product.361
If the nebulous notion of a color contributing to our size perception of the
product is worthy of analysis, I suggest that we do not understand the role
nontraditional trademarks is playing in our purchasing decisions. Do we buy the
black engine because we think engine should be black or because it identifies
source? Most likely, we have an inconsistent image in our minds about what
color things should be or how they should smell, etc. When Mrs. Clark makes
her skunks smell like plumeria,36 2 we are not only relieved, we like it. We do not
buy the skunks because the smell indicated source. Plumeria is a very fine scent.
We buy the skunks because we like the smell of plumeria, not because it
indicates source.
As such, nontraditional trademarks do not play the role of indicating source
and they cannot. Nontraditional trademarks merely make a product more
attractive. The product is purchased by buyers not because of the source
denoting capacity of the nontraditional mark but rather because of an extremely
inconsistent, subjective notion of what is "good" or "attractive."
359. See, e.g., Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (dual-spring
design is a functional feature) (2001).
360. Brunswick v. Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
361. Id. at 1529.
362. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
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D. Is it Worth it?
All this raises a very important question: is it worth it? I submit that it is not.
Nontraditional trademarks are much harder to get than traditional marks. On
average, nontraditional marks take more than 30 months to be registered.
Traditional marks take far less time.3 64 Nearly half of all nontraditional
trademarks applied for registration no longer exist. 365 The applications have
gone abandoned or the registrations have been cancelled for nonuse. Courts do
not enforce nontraditional trademarks.
Therefore, although obtaining a registration for a nontraditional mark is
possible in the United States, it is not worth it. It is not worth it from the
trademark claimants' viewpoint as it takes so long and most are lost or
abandoned. It is not worth it from society's point of view as allowing this
protection does not reduce transaction costs. Society gets nothing in return for
allowing the protection of nontraditional trademarks. Nontraditional marks do
not play the same role of reducing transaction costs so that our products cost
less.366 Nontraditional trademarks merely adorn and beautify our products.
Although I'm all in favor of pretty goods, pretty is not a trademark. As such,
trademark protection for nontraditional marks is not worth the investment.
XIV. CONCLUSION
There must be a reason why trademark harmonization has been so difficult to
realize. The world knows that a lack of harmonization contributes, in significant
ways, to the cost of doing business internationally. Harmonizing trademark laws
would be good for all. Yet, it has remained elusive.
The reason trademark doctrine has not been harmonized is because the
underlying theory of trademark protection between the Civil Law world on one
hand and the Common Law world, primarily the United States, on the other hand
are so disparate.
The protection of nontraditional trademarks in the United States is an
extreme manifestation of this divergence. With one holding from one Supreme
Court decision, nontraditional trademark applications for registration increased
exponentially. That decision merely said that there were no per se restrictions on
the subject matter of trademarks. "Any" meant any.
Civil Law jurisdictions do not have that flexibility. As positivists, they must
wait for their legislatures to enumerate the specific scope of trademark
protection. Their Examiners have very little experience in examining
nontraditional trademarks, to the extent applications are received.
363. See infra app. D.
364. See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
365. See infra app. C.
366. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
48 [Vol. 38:1
HeinOnline  -- 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 48 2011
NONTRADTHONAL TRADEMARKS
Therefore, until the theoretical orientation of trademark policy between the
Civil Law and the United States is harmonized, trademark harmonization efforts
will remain elusive. The United States exacerbates this issue by protecting
"any" indicator source. Civil Law countries make this exacerbation worse by
attempting to harmonize to the standard of protecting nontraditional trademarks,
meanwhile adhering to the Civil Law notion of trademark protection. That is,
this doctrinal harmonization will not be meaningful because it affects so few
trademarks and the trademark jurisprudence remains disparate. As such,
transaction costs incurred because of disparate trademark systems around the
world will not be reduced. This is truly harmonization that simply does not
matter.
The protection of nontraditional trademarks is further rendered suspect in the
United States by the fact that there has been such a spike in trademark
applications for nontraditional trademarks post-Qualitex, but the rate of litigation
has remained nearly static. That is, trademark owners are interested in applying
to register nontraditional marks, but they are not interested in enforcing them.
This raises the question of why? If trademark holders are interested in
registering nontraditional marks, why are they not enforcing them? When they
do, they only succeed 1/3 of the time.
If, for example, Japan harmonizes to the American standard of protecting
nontraditional trademarks, Japan will be making several mistakes. The first
mistake is to think that nontraditional trademarks add up to something in the
United States. They do not. Even though Qualitex held that color alone could
be protected and an explosion of interest developed regarding nontraditional
trademarks, the numbers still do not add up to much. The second mistake is to
believe that other countries are engaged in the protection of nontraditional
trademarks based on the survey from WIPO. They are not. Even though the
Singapore Treaty explicitly addresses nontraditional marks, they remain a very
rare entity in Civil Law systems. Finally, if Japan merely adopts a nontraditional
trademark system without thought to the underlying theory of trademark
protection, the harmonization will be empty.
These mistakes work to prove the point: real trademark harmonization has a
long way to go. We should not get distracted by meaningless claims like
protecting (or not) Frank Ogden's DNA sequence.
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APPENDIX A
Percentage Nontraditional Marks Actually Registered
Total Sound Mark Applications 336
Sound Total Registered Sound Marks 171
Percentage Total Sound Marks Registered 50.89%
Total Scent Mark Applications 28
Scent Total Registered Scent Marks 12
Percentage Total Scent Marks Registered 42.86%
Total Color Mark Applications 345
Color Total Registered Color Marks 242
Percentage Total Color Marks Registered 70.14%
Total Taste Mark Applications 9
Taste Total Registered Taste Marks 0
Percentage Total Taste Marks Registered 0.00%
Total Tactile Mark Applications 5
Tactile Total Registered Tactile Marks 1
Percentage Total Tactile Marks Registered 20.00%
Total No Description Mark Applications 16
No Description Total Registered No Description Marks 1
Percentage Total No Description Marks Registered 6.25%
Total Other Mark Applications 5
Other Total Registered Other Marks 2
Percentage Total Other Marks Registered 40.00%
Total Motion Applications 18
Motion Total Registered Motion Marks 13
Percentage Total Motion Marks Registered 72.22%
Total Hologram Applications 19
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Total Registered Hologram Marks
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Total Sound Mark Applications 336
Sound Total Pending Sound Marks 52
Percentage Total Sound Marks Pending 15.48%
Total Scent Mark Applications 28
Scent Total Pending Scent Marks 6
Percentage Total Scent Marks Pending 21.43%
Total Color Mark Applications 345
Color Total Pending Color Marks 1
Percentage Total Color Marks Pending 0.29%
Total Taste Mark Applications 9
Taste Total Pending Taste Marks 0
Percentage Total Taste Marks Pending 0.00%
Total Tactile Mark Applications 5
Tactile Total Pending Tactile Marks 1
Percentage Total Tactile Marks Pending 20.00%
Total No Description Mark Applications 16
No Description Total Pending No Description Marks 2
Percentage Total No Description Marks Pending 12.50%
Total Other Mark Applications 5
Other Total Pending Other Marks 2
Percentage Total Other Marks Pending 40.00%
Total Motion Applications 18
Motion Total Pending Motion Marks 2
Percentage Total Motion Marks Pending 11.11%
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Total Hologram A Mlications 19
Total Pendin Holgram Mark 3
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Total Sound Mark Applications
Total Cancelled Sound Marks
Percentage Total Sound Marks Cancelled
Total Scent Mark Applications _
Total Cancelled Scent Marks







Total Color Mark Applications 345
Total Cancelled Color Marks -50__
14,49
Percentage Total Color Marks Cancelled
Total Taste Mark Applications 9
Total Cancelled Taste Marks 0
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Total Cancelled No Description Marks _
Total Other Mrk Applications_____
Percentage Total Other Marks Cancelled
± _000%.
Total No Description Mark Applications
Total Tactile Mark Appcat
Total Cancelled Tactile Marks
68.75%
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Total Motion Applications 18
Total Cancelled Motion Marks 1
Percentage Total Motion Marks Cancelled 5.56%
Total Hologram Applications 19
Total Cancelled Hologram Marks 8
42.11
Percentage Total Hologram Marks Cancelled %26,32%
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Sound A gpegistration 1.97
Scent: Average Time Between Application Filing and Registration 2.2
Colr Avrg ieBtenApiainFln n eistration 3.1
Tactie: Averae Time Between A cation Filig and Reistration NA
Tactile: Average Time Between Application Filing and Registration 1.57
No tion: Avera e Time Between A lication Fi n andg Rngst i 2.37
Motion: Average Time Between Apl-,)ication Filing and Ristain16
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Total Sound Mark Applh6ations
1oalPotQuhtxSound Mark 'Apjphe"ations 295
Percentage Post-Qualitex Sound Mark Apphcations 87.80%
TotalScent Mak Appheations 28
Tota Post-Quatex Scent Mark Ahcations 27
Percenag os-Qate eet ak ppctin 96.43%
ITotal Color Mark Apphications
Total Post-Quahitex Color Mark Appliations
Perentge os-Quhte CoorMark Applications
Total Taste Mark Applications
Total Post-Qualitex Taste Mark Applications







I Total Tactile Mark Applications
Total Post-Qualitex Tactile Mark Applications __




Total No Description Mark Aplications 16
Total Post-Qualitex No Description Mark Applcations 9
Percentage Post-Qualitex No Description Mark Aplcations 5625%
Total Other Mark Applications 5
Total Post-Qualitex Other Mark Applicatio
Percentage Post-Qualitex Other Mark Appl
ns _5
ications 100 00%
Total Motion Mark Applications 18
17
9444%
Total Post-Qualitex Motion Mark Applications
[Percentage Post-Qualitex Motion MarkApplications
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